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THE AFTERMATH OF CATASTROPHES:
VALUING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
INSURANCE LOSSES
Christopher C. French*
ABSTRACT
With the onslaught of tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods in recent
years, business interruption losses have been staggering. Many
businesses do not survive such catastrophes. Even business owners
that purchased business interruption insurance, which is intended to
ensure that a business’s revenue stream continues during an
interruption in its operations, often find that their insurers have
dramatically different views regarding the amount of the losses that
should be reimbursed. The reason for this disparity in views is that
the loss valuation provisions in business interruption insurance
policies provide very little guidance regarding how business
interruption losses should be calculated. Thus, disputes regarding the
valuation of business interruption losses frequently arise and courts
and juries are forced to resolve such disputes with widely varying,
inconsistent, and unpredictable results. This lack of predictability has
placed a burden on the legal system because far more business
interruption cases are tried than are necessary.
This Article analyzes the origins and purpose of business
interruption insurance, as well as the courts’ inconsistent
interpretations of the standard form business interruption loss
valuation provisions. The Article then offers an interpretation of the
existing loss valuation provisions under the rules of policy
interpretation and considers whether the result would be different if
* Christopher C. French is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Columbia University. The author gratefully acknowledges the
legal research contributions of Amanda Lusk to this article. The author also would like to thank Daniel
Schwarcz, Jim Chen, and all of the participants in a workshop at Villanova Law School for providing
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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the language were analyzed from a product liability perspective in
light of the fact that policies are non-negotiated contracts of adhesion
sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The Article concludes with an
analysis of the public policy considerations related to the payment of
business interruption insurance losses and proposes alternative loss
valuation formulas to be used in the future that should provide for
consistent, fair and predictable loss valuations and payment of claims
without litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Business interruption losses caused by natural and unnatural
disasters are enormous. For example, the business interruption losses
associated with the 9/11 terrorist attack have been estimated to
exceed $10 billion.1 Hurricane Katrina caused more than $45 billion
in damage.2 The governors of New York and New Jersey estimated
that Hurricane Sandy caused more than $60 billion in damages.3
1. DANIEL T. TORPEY, DANIEL G. LENTZ & ALLEN MELTON, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION:
COVERAGE, CLAIMS, AND RECOVERY 4 (2d ed. 2011).
2. Gregory D. Miller & Joseph D. Jean, Effect of Post-Loss Economic Factors in Measuring
Business Interruption Losses: An Insured’s and Insurer’s Perspectives, in NEW APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 25, 25 (2010).
3. Editorial, Hurricane Sandy’s Rising Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012, at A32.

464

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

Many businesses impacted by such disasters never recover. Indeed,
the United States Department of Labor has estimated that 40% of
businesses never reopen after experiencing a disaster.4 Of those that
do, at least 25% fail within two years.5
Now imagine a business owner in an area that was just struck by a
flood, tornado, or hurricane. The business was damaged such that
operations had to be suspended. Lucky for the business owner,
however, he was able to resume operations in a few weeks or months
after repairs were made. Even better, he had the foresight to purchase
business interruption insurance, which is intended to place the
business owner in the position he would have occupied if the
catastrophe had not occurred.6
Yet, when the business owner submits a business interruption
claim to the insurer, the insurer denies coverage for the claim or
offers a paltry sum and advises the business owner that there would
have been little or no demand for the business’s services or products
during the time period its operations were being restored because the
area near the business was wiped out by the disaster. Thus, the
insurer tells the business owner that the business did not actually
suffer a business interruption loss because very few customers or
clients would have patronized the business following the disaster
even if the business had not been impacted. At best, the insurer tells
the owner, what little business he might have had would not have
covered the business’s fixed costs such as rent and payroll.7
Consequently, the insurance policy purchased to cover business
interruption losses provides little or no recovery because the
business’s projected earnings during the period of interruption would
not have exceeded its continuing fixed costs.8
4. John Grossman, A Business Ponders Whether Its Location is Perfect, or a Disaster, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2011, at B6.
5. Id.
6. Miller & Jean, supra note 2, at 25 (“Business interruption insurance, at its core, is intended to
place the insured in the position it would have been in had it not suffered a loss.”); Jon C. Rice, Business
Interruption Coverage in the Wake of Katrina: Measuring the Insured’s Loss in a Volatile Economy, 41
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 857, 857 (2006) (“The purpose of business interruption coverage is to
place the insured in the position it would have occupied had no interruption occurred.”).
7. See, e.g., Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tenn. 1992).
8. Id.
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Unfortunately, this is not a fictional scenario. It is all too real and it
is regularly experienced by many business owners throughout
America. There are countless business owners in New Jersey and
New York that are currently going through such an experience right
now in the wake of Hurricane Sandy.
Insurers take such a position due to the nebulous wording of the
loss valuation provisions buried in lengthy, complex, standard form
business interruption insurance policies that insurers draft and then
sell on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.9 The loss valuation language often
is worded as follows:
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.10

9. Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind. 2009) (“[T]he insurer drafts the policy and foists its
terms upon the customer.”); 401 Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Grp., 879 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. 2005)
(“[T]he insurer drafts the policy, and controls coverage.”). See also 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF
INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.06(b), at 4-37 (2d ed. Supp. 2005) (“In a sense, the typical
insurance contract is one of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely standardized and not
even reviewed prior to contract formation.”); Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy
Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 534 (1996); Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The
Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) (describing the “hyperstandardization”
of insurance policies); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard
policy that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declarations Sheet . . . . [T]here is
little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the insurance contract that determines
the scope of coverage.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 18 (1993); Susan
Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n some lines of
insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”);
Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1266–67,
1276 (2011) (citing sources that discuss the standardization of insurance policies and then arguing
homeowners insurance policies are not as standardized as other lines of insurance); Kent D. Syverud,
The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts
are standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain
around.”).
10. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
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Insurers rely upon the above italicized language when they attempt
to support the argument that business interruption losses are
negligible or non-existent in situations where the area surrounding a
business has been destroyed by a catastrophe such that the demand
for the impacted business’s services or products has been greatly
reduced or eliminated.11 Other times, if the catastrophe results in
increased demand for the policyholder’s services or products, then
the insurers argue only the pre-catastrophe sales and expenses of the
policyholder should be used to value the loss.12
Some courts have accepted the argument that the economic
conditions post-catastrophe should be considered when valuing
business interruption losses.13 Other courts have not.14 Courts also
have disagreed regarding which elements of a business interruption
loss are recoverable.15 In addition, some courts have required the
policyholder to prove the amount of any business interruption loss to
a “reasonable degree of certainty” even though such calculations are,
by necessity, only projections regarding what the policyholder would
have earned in the hypothetical world in which the catastrophe did
not occur.16 All of these inconsistencies and problems reflected in the
courts’ decisions flow from the nebulous valuation language that is
contained in business interruption policies.
In this Article, the author contends that if the existing policy
language continues to be used, then the ambiguities in it should be
construed in favor of policyholders and against insurers, which
should lead to inconsistent results that consistently favor
policyholders. A better approach, however, would be to redraft the
loss valuation provisions. Instead of using the vague loss valuation
language that currently exists, business interruption policies should
include a stated daily loss value for business interruption claims,
which already is developed and used during the underwriting

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.B.
Id.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra notes 120, 121.
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process.17 The stated daily loss value is the amount, at the time the
policy is placed, that the policyholder is projected to lose on a daily
basis if its operations are interrupted.18 It is a number that is derived
from the policyholder’s current expense and revenue data and is
revised annually during the policy renewal process so it always is up
to date. Insurers already use the number during the underwriting
process to assess the risk and establish the amount of the premium.19
Alternatively, only the policyholder’s earnings and cost data for the
three years prior to the business interruption could be used to value
business interruption losses. Using a three-year time period should
account for the seasonal or cyclical nature of some businesses’
revenue streams.
The advantages of using either proposal are that they establish a
fixed number that is agreed to by the parties at the time the policy is
placed regarding the amount a policyholder will be paid if its
operations are interrupted. Both proposals would eliminate debates
between the parties regarding the state of the economy, the trends in
the policyholder’s industry, and the impact the catastrophe had on the
local business climate. Such debates are at the center of the current
litigation regarding business interruption losses and they result in an
enormous waste of the parties’ and courts’ resources as cases
unnecessarily wind their way through the legal system and are
ultimately presented to juries because the outcomes of the cases are
unpredictable under the existing policy language.20 Thus, if adopted,
either proposal would provide consistent, predictable results and the
efficient resolution of claims without the necessity of litigation in
most instances.
This Article addresses these issues in four parts. Part One
discusses the origins and purpose of business interruption insurance,
which is to ensure that the policyholder’s revenue stream continues
during the period of interruption, as well as the policy language
17. See infra note 216.
18. Stan Johnson & Kevin O’Toole, Common Business Interruption Measurement Disputes, 19
JOHN LINER REV. 59, 65 (2005).
19. See infra note 216.
20. See infra Part II.
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relevant to the valuation of business interruption losses. Part Two
discusses the conflicting court opinions regarding the valuation of
business interruption losses. Part Three discusses the rules of policy
interpretation that are relevant to interpreting and applying the
existing policy language. Part Three also explores the idea that, in
light of the fact that policies are non-negotiated contracts of adhesion
sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the loss valuation language can be
viewed as a defective product if the policy fails to perform as
reasonably expected by the policyholder (i.e., the policyholder does
not receive payment from the insurer for the full amount of the
policyholder’s business interruption loss). Part Four discusses the
problems with the existing policy language and current approaches to
valuing business interruption losses. Part Four also discusses public
policy considerations, such as the importance of ensuring that
policyholders receive the benefit of the bargain for the premiums
they paid, and ensuring that the socially important purpose of
insurance—transferring the risk of losses from individuals and
businesses to insurers—is not frustrated by insurers’ interest in
maximizing their profits by minimizing the amounts they pay for
catastrophic losses by relying upon vaguely-worded loss valuation
provisions they themselves drafted and buried in policies that often
exceed fifty pages of single-spaced terms, conditions and exclusions.
The Article concludes with the author’s proposal that instead of using
the existing policy language, the policies either should contain a daily
loss value or specify that only the policyholders’ prior three years of
revenue and cost data will be used to calculate business interruption
losses. If insurers will not voluntarily redraft the loss valuation
language to clarify how business interruption losses will be
calculated, then the author proposes that: (1) courts should construe
the nebulous loss valuation language strictly against insurers as
required under the existing rules of policy interpretation, and (2)
legislatures should enact legislation that dictates how business
interruption losses will be valued in accordance with one of the
proposals made in this Article.
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I. RELEVANT POLICY LANGUAGE
A. The Origins of Business Interruption Insurance
The genealogy of business interruption insurance begins over two
hundred years ago and has its roots in insurance that was issued to
protect property owners’ rental income.21 Because property insurance
historically did not protect against lost rent, separate coverage had to
be purchased.22 Originally, such insurance was referred to as “use
and occupancy” insurance.23 In the 1930s, the name evolved to
business interruption insurance and in the 1980s the Insurance
Services Office (ISO) coined the term “business income insurance”
when it issued a new policy form for business interruption
insurance.24
As many courts and commentators have stated, the purpose of
business interruption insurance is to return the policyholder to the
position it would have occupied if the disaster had not occurred:
The purpose of business interruption insurance is to protect the
insured against losses that occur when its operations are
unexpectedly interrupted, and to place it in the position it would
have occupied if the interruption had not occurred.25

The modern forms of business interruption insurance, which cover
net profits plus continuing expenses such as payroll and taxes, were
introduced in the mid-1920s.26 There currently are two common
business interruption policy forms: 1) Gross Earnings and 2)
Business Income.27 Gross Earnings forms calculate business
21. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5. Use and occupancy insurance typically had a loss per day value set forth in the policy.
Id. at 6. Consequently, there was no need for, and little room to, debate what the amount of lost income
was in the event of a business interruption. Id.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Nw. States Portland
Cement Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 360 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1966)). See also Miller & Jean, supra note
2, at 25; Rice, supra note 6, at 857.
26. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 8.
27. Id. at 9, 14 (describing the gross earnings form and the business income form). See also David A.
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interruption losses from the top down, which means the business
interruption loss is the total amount the policyholder would have
earned if not for the interruption of its operations less the costs or
expenses the policyholder did not incur due to the interruption in its
business (i.e., the variable costs it saved because its operations were
suspended).28 Business Income forms calculate business interruption
losses from the bottom up, which means the business interruption
loss is the net income the policyholder would have earned if not for
the interruption plus the policyholder’s continuing fixed expenses
such as payroll and taxes.29 In theory, the amount of a business
interruption loss should be the same under the two policy forms.30
B. The Policy Language Regarding the Valuation of Business
Interruption Losses
Although there are many minor variations in the wording used in
business interruption policies because insurers often have their own
policy form that they prefer to use, all such forms are drafted by
insurers.31 The policies are contracts of adhesion and sold on a takeit-or-leave-it basis.32 One common version of the insuring agreement
language found in Gross Earnings policy forms provides:
[The insurer] shall be liable for the ACTUAL LOSS
SUSTAINED by insured resulting directly from such
interruption of business, but not exceeding the reduction in gross
earnings less charges and expenses which do not necessarily

Borghesi, Business Interruption Insurance: A Business Perspective, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1147, 1150
(1993) (discussing the types of business interruption policy forms); Lori R. Keeton, Business
Interruption Coverage in the Wake of the Gulf Coast Oil Spill: The Devil Is in the Details, ASPATORE
(Mar. 2011), 2011 WL 971800, at *6.
28. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 10–12; Borghesi, supra note 27, at 1150; Keeton,
supra note 27, at *6.
29. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 15; Borghesi, supra note 27, at 1150; Keeton, supra
note 27, at *6.
30. Borghesi, supra note 27, at 1150.
31. See supra note 9.
32. Id.

2014]

VALUING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE LOSS

471

continue during the interruption . . . .33

In short, the policyholder is entitled to recover its lost gross earnings
less saved variable expenses.
A common version of the insuring agreement language used in
Business Income policy forms is worded as follows:
[The insurer] will pay an insured during its period of suspended
business operation the “(i) Net Income (Net Profit or Loss before
income taxes) that would have been earned or incurred if no
physical loss or damage had occurred . . . ; and (ii) Continuing
normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll[.]”34

In short, the policyholder is entitled to recover its net profits plus
fixed continuing expenses.
The loss valuation provisions are commonly worded as follows:
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.35

33. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005). For similar
insuring agreement language, see also Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d
511, 514 (5th Cir. 2010); Prudential LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Colleton Enters., Inc., No. 91-1757,
1992 WL 252507, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1992); Consol. Cos. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-4700, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *16–17 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2009); Berk-Cohen Assocs. v. Landmark Am. Ins.
Co., No. 07-9205, 2009 WL 2777163, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2009); B.F. Carvin Constr. Co. v. CNA
Ins. Co., No. 06-7155, 2008 WL 5784516, at *1 (E.D. La. July 14, 2008); Levitz Furniture Corp. v.
Hous. Cas. Co., No. 96-1790, 1997 WL 218256, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1997); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Fisherman’s Paradise Boats, Inc., No. 93-2349CIVGRAHAM, 1994 WL 1720238, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
3, 1994).
34. Amerigraphics, Inc. v. Mercury Cas. Co., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting policy language). For similar insuring agreement language, see also Catlin Syndicate Ltd., 600
F.3d at 514; Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314; Prudential LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 1992 WL 252507,
at *1; Consol. Cos., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *16–17; Berk-Cohen, 2009 WL 2777163, at *4;
B.F. Carvin Constr. Co., 2008 WL 5784516, at *1; Levitz Furniture Corp., 1997 WL 218256, at *3; Am.
Auto. Ins. Co., 1994 WL 1720238, at *3.
35. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314 (emphasis added). See also cases cited infra notes 44, 67.

472

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

Notably, the term “gross earnings” is not defined in the policies.36
Also, this language clearly contemplates doing a projection regarding
the business’s “probable experience” if the loss had not occurred.37
Another version of the valuation language that also is often used
provides:
We’ll cover your actual loss of earnings and extra expenses
incurred because of necessary or potential interruption of
business . . . . In figuring earnings, we’ll weigh the performance
of your business before the loss and what its performance
probably would have been afterwards had no loss occurred.38

Again, the language contemplates that an analysis will be conducted
regarding what the policyholder’s hypothetical “performance
probably would have been” if no loss had occurred.39
II. COURTS’ INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE POLICY
LANGUAGE REGARDING THE VALUATION OF BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
LOSSES
Due to the broad language used in the loss valuation provisions of
business interruption insurance, the use of many undefined terms,
and the fact that a formula for valuing business interruption losses is
not actually contained in such provisions, it should come as no
36. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314.
37. Id.
38. Cohen Furniture Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill., 573 N.E.2d 851, 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(emphasis added). See also cases cited infra notes 44, 67.
39. Notably, some policies contain language that specifically precludes the consideration of
policyholder-favorable economic conditions post-loss when valuing the business interruption loss. Such
policies commonly are worded as follows:
The amount of Business Income loss will be determined based on:
(1) The Net Income of the business before the direct physical loss or damage occurred;
(2) The likely Net Income of the business if no physical loss or damage occurred, but not
including any likely increase in Net Income attributable to an increase in the volume of
business as a result of favorable business conditions caused by the impact of the Covered
Cause of loss on customers or on other businesses . . . .
Legier & Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., No. 09-6674, 2010 WL 1731202, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr.
28, 2010). See also Berk-Cohen Assocs, 2009 WL 2777163, at *3; Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
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surprise that the courts’ decisions regarding how business
interruption losses should be valued are varied and inconsistent.
Some courts interpret the valuation language to require that the loss
calculation be based upon only the historical financial data of the
policyholder.40 Other courts also allow the local post-catastrophe
economic conditions to be considered.41 In addition, when applying
the standard valuation language to claims that arise under similar
factual scenarios, the courts have reached patently inconsistent
conclusions regarding which of the policyholder’s ongoing expenses
are recoverable.42 One consistency, however, does appear in the
decisions—the courts are confused regarding the evidentiary standard
that should apply when a policyholder is attempting to prove the
amount of its business interruption loss.43
A. Courts That Have Interpreted the Loss Valuation Language to
Allow for Consideration of Only Historical Financial Data
One school of thought, which most notably has been endorsed by
the Fifth Circuit, only considers the historical financial data of the
policyholder when calculating business interruption losses.44 In
Finger Furniture,45 the policyholder owned seven furniture stores in
Houston, Texas.46 Tropical Storm Allison hit the Houston area and

40. See infra Part II.A.
41. See infra Part II.B.
42. See infra Part II.C.
43. See infra Part II.D.
44. Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 2010)
(following Finger Furniture and only allowing the use of historical financial information when
determining a business interruption loss); Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d
312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005) (allowing only historical financial information to be used to predict
policyholder’s “probable experience” during period of interruption); Prudential LMI Commercial Ins.
Co. v. Colleton Enters., Inc., No. 91-1757, 1992 WL 252507, at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1992) (disallowing
the policyholder to calculate its business interruption loss based upon favorable post-loss economic
environment created by a hurricane); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisherman’s Paradise Boats, Inc., No. 932349CIVGRAHAM, 1994 WL 1720238, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 1994) (citing Colleton, 1992 WL
252507, at *2) (finding increased demand for policyholder’s products due to favorable economic
environment created by a hurricane cannot be considered when valuing the policyholder’s business
interruption loss).
45. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2005).
46. Id. at 313.
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caused severe flooding.47 As a result, the policyholder could not open
its stores for a period of time.48 Consequently, the policyholder
submitted a business interruption loss claim to its insurer.49 The
parties could not agree on the amount of the business interruption
loss, litigation ensued, and ultimately the parties filed cross motions
for summary judgment.50 The policy at issue contained the following
language:
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.51

Relying upon the “probable experience thereafter” policy
language, the insurer argued the policyholder did not actually suffer a
business interruption loss because demand for furniture in the area
was high after the tropical storm passed and the policyholder was
able to quickly make up the sales allegedly lost during the period of
interruption.52 The Fifth Circuit rejected the insurer’s argument and
held that only the policyholder’s historical sales figures could be used
to calculate the loss.53 In explaining its decision, the court stated:
The policy language indicates that a business-interruption loss
will be based on historical sales figures. Specifically, the policy
states that “due consideration shall be given to the experience of
the business before the date of the damage or destruction and to
the probable experience thereafter had no loss occurred.”
Historical sales figures reflect a business’s experience before the
date of the damage or destruction and predict a company’s
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314.
Id.
Id.
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probable experience had the loss not occurred. The strongest and
most reliable evidence of what a business would have done had
the catastrophe not occurred is what it had been doing in the
period just before the interruption.54

The court further explained that, contrary to the insurer’s position,
the policy did not expressly state that post-catastrophe sales should
be considered when determining what the sales would have been had
the storm not occurred:
[T]he business-loss provision says nothing about taking into
account actual post-damage sales to determine what the insured
would have experienced had the storm not occurred. The
contract language does not suggest that the insurer can look
prospectively to what occurred after the loss to determine
whether its insured incurred a business-interruption loss. Instead,
the policy requires due consideration of the business’s
experience before the date of the loss and the business’s probable
experience had the loss not occurred. [The policyholder’s]
historical sales figures reflect that consideration.55

Thus, in this instance, the court’s decision not to consider the postcatastrophe economic conditions favored the policyholder.
Five years later, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to
considering only the policyholder’s historical financial information
when valuing business interruption losses in Catlin Syndicated Ltd. v.
Imperial Palace of Mississippi, Inc.56 In Catlin, the policyholder
operated a casino that was damaged by Hurricane Katrina. 57The
casino was shut down for several months, but when it reopened “its
revenues were . . . greater than before the hurricane[,]” because
“many [of the] nearby casinos remained closed.”58 In valuing the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
See Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 512.
Id.
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business interruption loss for the casino, there was a $100 million
discrepancy between the policyholder’s calculation, which was based
in part upon the business’s post-hurricane experience, and the
insurer’s calculation, which was based upon only the business’s prehurricane experience.59
The valuation language in the policy at issue was worded as
follows: “In determining the amount of the Time Element60 loss as
insured against by this policy, due consideration shall be given to
experience of the business before the loss and the probable
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.”61 With each party
arguing that the court should adopt their interpretation of the policy
language, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.62
The court, relying upon Finger Furniture, held only the historical
sales information could be used to calculate the loss.63 The court
explained its reasoning as follows:
Finger Furniture tells us “that a business-interruption loss will
be based on historical sales figures,” and that we should not
“look prospectively to what occurred after the loss.” Thus, in the
business-interruption provision at hand, only historical sales
figures should be considered when determining loss, and sales
figures after reopening should not be taken into account.64

Thus, unlike in Finger Furniture, the court’s decision not to allow
post-catastrophe economic conditions to be considered favored the
insurer.
In both cases, however, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the “probable
experience thereafter” phrase to mean the probable experience the

59. Id. at 512–13.
60. Business interruption insurance is a type of insurance that sometimes is referred to as “time
element” insurance, because the period of time a business is interrupted is one of the principal factors
involved in valuing the loss. Bernard P. Bell, General Purpose of Time Element Insurance, in 5 NEW
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 46.01 (2013).
61. Catlin, 600 F.3d at 513.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 516.
64. Id. (citing Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005)).
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policyholder would have had post-catastrophe, assuming the
policyholder’s post-catastrophe experience would be identical to its
pre-catastrophe experience.65 Several courts in other jurisdictions
have reached similar conclusions.66
B. Courts That Have Interpreted the Loss Valuation Language to
Allow for the Consideration of Local Economic Conditions PostCatastrophe
At the other end of the spectrum, several courts have held that
local post-catastrophe economic conditions should be considered
when business interruption losses are valued.67 Although there are
not enough decisions, particularly appellate decisions, on the issue to
proclaim that any particular school of thought is the majority
position, more courts, especially in Louisiana, have endorsed this
approach than the Fifth Circuit’s approach.68
A leading case, and arguably the controlling authority on the issue
under Louisiana law, that used this approach is Sher v. Lafayette
Insurance Co.69 In Sher, the policyholder owned an apartment
building in New Orleans that was damaged by Hurricane Katrina.70
Although there were multiple issues in dispute between the
policyholder and the insurer, the primary dispute with respect to the
65. Id. at 514; Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314.
66. See supra note 44.
67. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 25 Fed. App’x 602, 603 (9th Cir.
2002) (allowing insurer to use “make up” sales of the policyholder post-loss to reduce the amount
owed); Consol. Cos. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-4700, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *20 (E.D. La.
Jan. 23, 2009) (allowing jury to base award to policyholder upon increased demand created by
hurricane); Berk-Cohen Assocs. v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., No. 07-9205, 2009 WL 2777163, at *5
(E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2009) (allowing policyholder to use higher post-loss rent values when calculating its
business interruption loss); B.F. Carvin Constr. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., No. 06-7155, 2008 WL 5784516,
*3 (E.D. La. July 14, 2008) (finding policyholder did not suffer a business interruption loss because
favorable economic conditions post-loss caused an increase in sales); Levitz Furniture Corp. v. Hous.
Cas. Co., No. 96-1790, 1997 WL 218256, *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1997) (allowing policyholder to
calculate its business interruption loss based upon higher demand for its product caused by flooding);
Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 973 So. 2d 39, 62 (La. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 988 So. 2d
186, 205 (La. 2008) (allowing policyholder to use higher post-loss rent values in calculating its business
interruption loss).
68. See cases cited supra note 67.
69. Sher, 973 So. 2d at 47.
70. Id.
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business interruption claim related to whether pre-Katrina or postKatrina rent rates should be used to value the business interruption
loss.71
The policy language at issue provided: “We will pay for the actual
loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary suspension
of your ‘operations’ during the ‘period of restoration.’”72 The
policyholder argued that, under this language, post-Katrina rent rates
should be used because housing had become scarce due to the
extensive damage in the area, while the insurer argued pre-Katrina
rates should be used.73
The case was tried to a jury and the jury found in favor of the
policyholder.74 On appeal, the intermediate appellate court, with little
explanation, held that the policyholder could recover the higher postKatrina rent rates, stating “the Policy covers [the policyholder’s]
‘actual loss’ of business income.”75 In making this statement, the
court implicitly interpreted the phrase “actual loss” to mean the
amount the policyholder would have earned if the policyholder’s
business had not been damaged by the hurricane but the area around
the policyholder’s business had been damaged.76 Because the jury
agreed with the policyholder’s loss calculation using the post-Katrina
rent rates, the court affirmed the jury verdict.77 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts’ rulings on
some issues, but not the holdings regarding the valuation of the
business interruption loss.78 Thus, the Louisiana state courts
implicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s approach by allowing the
consideration of post-catastrophe economic conditions in valuing the
loss.79

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Sher, 973 So. 2d at 57.
Id.
Id.
Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186, 205 (La. 2008).
See cases cited supra note 67.
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Another Louisiana decision in which the court held the
policyholder’s business interruption loss should be calculated based
upon post-catastrophe economic conditions is Berk-Cohen
Associates, LLC v. Landmark American Insurance Co.80 In BerkCohen, the policyholder was the owner of an apartment complex that
was damaged by “a series of unfortunate events.”81 First, a tornado
struck the apartment complex.82 Two weeks later, before any repairs
had been made, Hurricane Katrina “decimated” New Orleans and
further damaged the apartment complex.83 Then, while the postKatrina repairs were underway, a fire broke out at the apartment
complex.84 Finally, while repairs were again underway, a vehicle
struck a transformer, which caused a power outage.85 From beginning
to end, the repair work took almost two years to complete.86
When valuing the business interruption loss, the parties could not
agree on the amount of the loss because, among other reasons, the
policyholder contended the housing shortage caused by Hurricane
Katrina increased the rental value of the apartments by 40%.87 The
insurer, on the other hand, valued the loss based upon pre-Katrina
rates.88 The valuation language in the policy provided:
The amount of Business Income loss will be determined based
on: (1) The Net Income of the business before the direct physical
loss or damage occurred; (2) The likely Net Income of the
business if no physical loss or damage had occurred, but not
including any Net Income that would likely have been earned as
a result of an increase in the volume of business due to favorable
business conditions caused by the impact of the Covered Cause

80. Berk-Cohen Assocs. v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., No. 07-9205, 2009 WL 2777163 (E.D. La. Aug.
27, 2009).
81. Id. at *1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Berk-Cohen, 2009 WL 2777163, at *1.
87. Id. at *3.
88. Id.
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of Loss on customers or on other businesses[.]89
....
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.90

The court held the policyholder’s recovery should be based upon
the post-Katrina rental rates.91 In reaching its holding, the court
distinguished Finger Furniture,92 the ostensibly controlling Fifth
Circuit authority, by accepting the policyholder’s argument that: (1)
the policy language at issue was different than the language in Finger
Furniture, and (2) the policy language quoted above that provides the
loss will not be valued based upon favorable post-catastrophe
business conditions created by a “covered cause of loss” did not
apply because flooding, an excluded cause of loss, as opposed to a
covered cause of loss, created the favorable business conditions93
Thus, the court allowed the policyholder to successfully circumvent
the policy language which, on its face, appeared to preclude
consideration of the favorable post-catastrophe business conditions in
the area.
Although the reasoning has varied somewhat from decision to
decision, several other courts also have reached the conclusion that
post-catastrophe economic conditions should be considered when
valuing business interruption losses.94

89. Id.
90. Id. at *4 (citing Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir.
2005)).
91. Id. at *5.
92. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005).
93. Berk-Cohen, 2009 WL 2777163, at *5.
94. See supra note 67.
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C. Courts’ Inconsistent Holdings Regarding the Application of the
Loss Valuation Language
In addition to disagreeing on whether post-catastrophe economic
conditions should be considered when analyzing business
interruption losses, the courts also have reached inconsistent
conclusions regarding when, and whether, certain expenses are
recoverable under the standard valuation language contained in
business interruption policies.95 This inconsistency is highlighted by
95. Compare Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp., 141 F.2d 443,
446 (10th Cir. 1944) (affirming lower court’s ruling in favor of policyholder and finding “no prescribed
formula for the determination of the actual loss of net profits and business expenses covered by the
policy”), Legier & Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., No. 096674, 2010 WL 1731202, at *1, *3
(E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2010) (allowing policyholder to recover net income plus continuing fixed costs but
requiring the policyholder to credit the insurer with revenues received during the period of interruption
and noting “the policy does not prescribe an explicit formula to calculate loss of business income”),
Amerigraphics, Inc. v. Mercury Cas. Co., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (allowing
policyholder to recover its continuing fixed costs even if it would have suffered a loss during the period
of interruption in the absence of a flood), and Gates v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 196 S.W.3d 761, 766–
67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (allowing policyholder to recover revenues that would have been received
after the period of interruption so long as they were “earned” during the period of interruption), with
Polymer Plastics Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 389 F. App’x 703, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
earnings made during period of interruption should be used to reduce the amount of the business
interruption loss), Associated Photographers, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 677 F.2d 1251, 1256 (8th
Cir. 1982) (holding the insurer can deduct the amount of saved variable expenses when calculating the
amount of a business interruption loss), Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 360
F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1966) (finding where inventory was sold to prevent loss of earnings during
period of business interruption, only the extra expenses incurred to replace the inventory sold was
recoverable), HTI Holdings, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10-6021-AA, 2011 WL 6205903, at *7
(D. Or. Dec. 8, 2011) (holding that projected negative net income during period of interruption can be
used by insurer to offset continuing fixed costs when calculating a business interruption loss amount),
Admiral Indem. Co. v. Bouley Int’l Holding, LLC, No. 02 Civ. 9696(HB), 2003 WL 22682273, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2003) (holding amounts paid to policyholder for different use of property during
period of interruption should be used to reduce amount of the business interruption loss), Stone
Container Corp. v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93C6626, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3978, at *8–9 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 25, 1997) (finding that policyholder did not suffer a business interruption loss because it was
able to satisfy orders by selling inventory which the policyholder did not replenish after the period of
interruption), Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 861 N.E.2d 263, 271 (Ill. App. Ct.
2006) (holding insurer can use policyholder’s sales during period of interruption to reduce amount of
policyholder’s loss), Lyon Metal Prods., LLC v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co., 747 N.E.2d 495, 504 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001) (finding insurer can offset payments made for damaged inventory when calculating the value of
the business interruption loss), Cohen Furniture Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill., 573 N.E.2d 851, 857 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (holding policyholder cannot recover depreciation for a completely destroyed building
because depreciation is not a continuing expense under business interruption insurance in that
circumstance), J&R Elecs. Inc. v. One Beacon Ins. Co., No. 603284/2004, 2005 WL 4257996, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 2005) (holding policyholder cannot recover for damaged merchandise under
both property damage provisions of policy and business interruption provisions of policy), Cont’l Ins.
Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tenn. 1992) (finding insurer must add projected net income
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the courts’ treatment of the issue of whether a policyholder can
recover its continuing fixed expenses such as rent and payroll in
situations where the policyholder likely would have lost money
during the period of interruption, even if its operations had not been
interrupted.96
Consider again the insuring agreement provisions commonly
found in standard business interruption policies:
[The insurer] will pay an insured during its period of suspended
business operation the “(i) Net Income (Net Profit or Loss before
income taxes) that would have been earned or incurred if no
physical loss or damage had occurred . . . ; and (ii) Continuing
normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll[.]”97

Thus, a question that arises is whether a policyholder can recover its
continuing operating expenses during the period of interruption if it
was actually losing money prior to the business interruption and was
projected to continue losing money during the period of interruption
even if the interruption had not occurred. In other words, does one
add together the projected “net income” and “continuing operating
expenses” in determining the recoverable loss or are the “continuing
operating expenses” recoverable regardless of whether the “net
income” figure is positive or negative?

and continuing expenses together when calculating a business interruption claim even if the net income
number is negative), and Keetch v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992) (holding decrease in business activity due to a partial interruption of business, as opposed to a
complete interruption of business, is not a reimbursable business interruption loss).
96. Compare Amerigraphics, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 318 (allowing insured to recover its continuing
fixed costs), with DNE, 834 S.W.2d at 934 (denying insured recovery of business income).
97. Amerigraphics, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 312. See also Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of
Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 2010); Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314; Prudential LMI
Commercial Ins. Co. v. Colleton Enters., Inc., No. 91-1757, 1992 WL 252507, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 5,
1992); Berk-Cohen, 2009 WL 2777163, at *4; Consol. Cos. v. Lexington Ins., No. 06-4700, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *16–17 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2009); B.F. Carvin Constr. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., No.
06-4700, 2008 WL 5784516, at *1 (E.D. La. July 14, 2008); Levitz Furniture Corp. v. Hous. Cas. Co.,
No. 96-1790, 1997 WL 218256, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1997); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisherman’s
Paradise Boats, Inc., No. 93-2349CIVGRAHAM, 1994 WL 1720238, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 1994).
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Two decisions, Amerigraphics, Inc. v. Mercury Casualty Co.98 and
Continental Insurance Co. v. DNE Corp.,99 illustrate the courts’
inconsistent interpretations of this policy language. In
Amerigraphics, the policyholder was a printing and graphics
company.100 Following the 9/11 terrorist attack, business was poor.101
Post-9/11, while business was poor, the company’s premises were
flooded.102 The insurer refused to pay the policyholder anything for
its business interruption claim under the theory that the policyholder
was losing money at the time of the business interruption and would
have continued to lose money even if its operations had not been
interrupted.103 The policyholder contended it nonetheless was entitled
to recover its continuing fixed costs without an offset for the
projected negative net income.104
The trial court agreed with the policyholder and the intermediate
appellate court affirmed, stating:
[U]nder the plain language of the policy, the business-income
provision should be interpreted to mean that [the insurer] will
pay an insured for any lost income and will pay an insured its
continuing normal business expenses during the period of
business suspension. To the extent there is no lost income (i.e.,
there is only a net loss), the amount paid under subpart (i) would
be zero, but the insured would still be paid under subpart (ii) for
its operating expenses . . . . [T]he policy does not use the words
“plus,” “offset,” “subtract,” “minus,” or the like. It uses the word
“and.” The plain meaning of “and” is consistent with [the
policyholder’s] and the trial court’s interpretation.105

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Amerigraphics, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
DNE, 834 S.W.2d at 930.
Amerigraphics, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 318–19.
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Thus, the policyholder was allowed to recover its continuing fixed
expenses even though it would have incurred a loss if its business
operations had not been interrupted.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reached the opposite conclusion
in DNE.106 In DNE, the policyholder made transmission and gear
products for the automotive industry.107 It had been operating at a
loss for some time prior to when its operations were interrupted due
to a tornado.108 As was the case in Amerigraphics, the policyholder
contended recovery of its continuing fixed expenses should not be
offset by its projected net income loss.109 The insurer contended the
policyholder should recover nothing because the policyholder’s
projected net income loss exceeded the continuing fixed expenses.110
The trial court ruled in favor of the insurer.111 The Supreme Court
of Tennessee affirmed, stating:
The purpose of business interruption insurance is to protect the
insured against losses that occur when its operations are
unexpectedly interrupted, and to place it in the position it would
have occupied if the interruption had not occurred . . . . [T]he
interpretation advocated by [the policyholder] (i.e., ignoring “net
income” whenever there is a net loss) would put the insured, in
all cases when there is a net loss, in a better economic position
from having had its business interrupted than it would have
occupied had there been no interruption of its business
operations . . . . We therefore conclude that the amount of
“business income” under the insurance policy provision involved
in this case should be determined by adding the amount of “net
income” and the amount of “continuing normal operating
expenses.” Under this approach, if “net income” is a positive
number (which will occur whenever there are net profits), the

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1992).
Id. at 931.
Id.
Id. at 932.
Id.
Id.
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amount of “business income” will be the sum of two positive
numbers, and the insured will be entitled to recover that amount.
If, however, “net income” is a negative number (which will
occur whenever there is a net loss), the amount of “business
income” will be the amount of “continuing normal operating
expenses” reduced by the amount of the net loss.112

Thus, the court would not allow the policyholder to recover
continuing fixed expenses if they exceeded the amount of the
projected net income loss.
The court’s decision in DNE raises the specter that, in a
jurisdiction such as Tennessee, an insurer may be engaging in a form
of fraud by selling business interruption insurance to a policyholder
whose business is operating at a loss.113 If the policy does not cover
the continuing operating expenses of a business that is losing money
when its operations are interrupted by a covered loss, then what value
does the policyholder receive in exchange for the premium it pays for
business interruption coverage?
Aside from raising that intriguing question, the answer to which is
beyond the scope of this Article, the DNE and Amerigraphics
decisions highlight that the courts have reached inconsistent, and in
some instances, polar opposite conclusions when attempting to
interpret and apply the existing valuation language contained in
business interruption policies.

112. DNE, 834 S.W.2d at 934 (citations omitted).
113. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 1997) (affirming damages awarded to
plaintiff by jury holding that insurer engaged in intentional and reckless fraud by selling a worthless
Medicare supplement insurance policy); Glazewski v. Coronet Ins. Co., 483 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ill.
1985) (“We are of the opinion that the issuance of coverage by an insurance company in return for a
premium is a tacit representation to the consumer that the coverage has value. Assuming for purposes of
a motion to dismiss that plaintiffs’ allegations that the coverage has no value are true, we find that the
insurance company defendants have made a false representation as to the value of the coverage by
issuing it without disclosing that it had no value.”).
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D. Courts’ Confusion Regarding the Evidentiary Standard Under
Which Business Interruption Losses Must be Proven
Although the courts do not agree on how the existing standard
valuation language should be interpreted or applied to business
interruption losses, there is one consistency in the case law—the
courts consistently are confused regarding the evidentiary standard to
apply to business interruption claims.114 This is not surprising
because a business interruption loss valuation is an inherently
speculative exercise under the existing policy language. Thus, what
should the burden of proof be regarding a speculative damages
claim?
Consider again the applicable language found in many business
interruption policies today:
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable
115
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.

Under this language, the policyholder is asked to prove what the
“probable” experience would have been if the loss had not
occurred.116 In short, the policyholder must prove what its
hypothetical earnings and expenses would have been.

114. Polytech, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding business
interruption losses must be proven “with reasonable certainty” and “without resorting to speculation”);
E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1074 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding
policyholder has burden of providing non-speculative evidence regarding amount of its loss);
Dictiomatic, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 958 F. Supp. 594, 603 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding policyholder
that introduced “contradictory projections” regarding its alleged business interruption loss failed to meet
its burden of proof); Howard Stores Corp. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 441 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981) (finding policyholder failed to meet its burden of proving its loss was due to business interruption
rather than other causes).
115. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added). See also cases cited supra notes 44, 67.
116. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314.
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Some commentators have described the inherently speculative
nature of business interruption loss valuations as follows:
Calculating lost income is considerably more conceptual and
theoretical than evaluating and determining replacement or
repair of damaged property. Business interruption evaluation
often involves theoretical calculations that require significant
and difficult projections such as a projection of the period of
interruption and of the business that would have been conducted
during the period of interruption. Adjustment of a business
interruption loss therefore often requires the parties to apply the
terms of the policy against an estimate of what the business
would have earned had the loss not occurred. The exercise is
challenging because it requires “proof” of something which
never occurred but what should have occurred but for an
interrupting event.117
....
As John F. Kennedy said, “I dream of things that never were,”
[thus, we] similarly acknowledge that calculating lost income is,
by definition, speculative.118

Not surprisingly, the fact that business interruption loss valuations
are inherently speculative under the existing policy language has
caused the courts some consternation when trying to apply traditional
evidentiary standards of proof to such claims.119 On the one hand, it
is hornbook law that damages should be proven to a “reasonable
degree of certainty.”120 Yet, how does one prove to a reasonable
117. Lawrence T. Bowman & Kendall K. Hayden, A Practical Guide to Evaluating Contingent
Business Interruption Losses, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, 49, 50 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
118. Id. at 66 (citing Jess B. Millikan, Practice Tips: Time Element Losses During Catastrophes, 31
BRIEF 52 (2002)).
119. See, e.g., Polytech, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1994); E. Associated
Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1980).
120. Harbor House Condo. Ass’n v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1990); ATACS
Corp. v. Trans World Commc’ns, 155 F.3d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n injured party need only
prove damages with reasonable certainty.”). See also LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 175:64 (3d ed. 2005) (“But there can be no recovery where the loss cannot be determined
within reasonable certainty.”).
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degree of certainty something that is an inherently speculative
valuation regarding the earnings and expenses a policyholder would
have had in the hypothetical world in which the loss did not occur?
Several courts’ decisions seem to suggest that, at least based upon the
facts presented in the cases at issue, policyholders may not be able to
do so.121
The Third Circuit’s opinion in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.122 is illustrative of this point. In
Eastern, the policyholder was a coal mine operator.123 The
policyholder produced different classifications of coal such as low
sulphur and high sulphur coal that are used in different
manufacturing processes.124 The price for the coal depended upon its
sulphur content, which was impacted by a treatment done to the coal
known as “washing.”125 A fire caused the interruption of coal
production for a year.126 When valuing the policyholder’s business
interruption loss, the parties disputed what percent of the lost coal
sales would have been high sulphur versus low sulphur coal.127
At trial, the jury found in favor of the policyholder.128 The trial
court nonetheless entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in
favor of the insurer because it thought the evidence supporting the
policyholder’s claim was too “speculative.”129 The Third Circuit
agreed.130 In explaining its holding, the Third Circuit stated:
[W]e hold that the evidence of the sulphur content of coal in the
mine alone was insufficient for the jury to determine the sulphur
content at the time of delivery. Without evidence of the
effectiveness of the washing process, the jury could only
speculate concerning the sulphur content at the time of delivery.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See, e.g., Polytech, 21 F.3d 271; E. Associated Coal Corp., 632 F.2d 1068.
E. Associated Coal Corp., 632 F.2d 1068.
Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1071–72.
E. Associated Coal Corp., 632 F.2d at 1072.
Id.
Id. at 1074.
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There is no evidence from which the jury could infer the
effectiveness of washing. It was [the policyholder’s] burden to
provide evidence from which its claim can be established.131

In short, the court required the policyholder to prove to a reasonable
certainty what apparently could not be proven—what the sulfur
content in the coal that would have been mined, treated, and sold
would have been if the fire had not occurred.132
Similarly, in Polytech, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co.,133 an
explosion and fire caused an interruption in the policyholder’s
plexiglass manufacturing business.134 The parties disputed the
amount of, and approach to proving, the business interruption loss.135
On the morning the trial was scheduled to commence, the trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of the policyholder.136
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for
trial because it found there was “conflicting evidence as to the
existence of future earnings”137 Notably, in remanding the case, the
court announced the following evidentiary standard for the
policyholder to satisfy: “‘[T]o obtain a damage award for lost profits
at trial, [the policyholder] must produce evidence that provides an
adequate basis for estimating lost profits with reasonable certainty.
Proof of actual facts which present a basis for a rational estimate of
damages without resorting to speculation is required.’”138 In short,
the policyholder was instructed on remand to prove, without
speculative evidence, what would have happened had its business not
been interrupted.139
Cases such as the Eastern and Polytech decisions raise the
following question: can a policyholder prove, to a “reasonable
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Polytech, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1994).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 272–73.
137. Id. at 277.
138. Id. at 276 (quoting Manor Square, Inc. v. Heartthrob of Kan. City, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 38, 44 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993)).
139. Polytech, 21 F.3d at 276.
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certainty,” the reality of a fictional situation? Of course they cannot.
Nor, as is discussed below in Part IV.A.1., should they be expected
or required to do so.
III. PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION RELEVANT
TO VALUING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES
When courts are asked to interpret and apply policy language such
as the loss valuation language quoted above, three well-established
rules of policy interpretation are particularly relevant to the analysis:
(1) contra proferentem, (2) the “reasonable expectations” doctrine,
and (3) construction of the policy as a whole.140
A. The Doctrine of Contra Proferentem
It is hornbook insurance law that because insurers are the drafters
of policy language such as the loss valuation provisions contained in
business interruption insurance policies,141 the doctrine of contra
proferentem applies, which means any ambiguities in the policy
language should be construed against the insurers and in favor of
coverage.142 The test under many states’ laws for determining
140. See discussion infra Part III.A–C.
141. See supra note 9.
142. Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and
Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 223–24 (2012).
See also Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971) (“Any ambiguity or
uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer.”); Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997) (“If there is an ambiguity, however, the contract
language is ‘construed most strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.’”); Crawford v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan. 1989) (“Since an insurer prepares its own contracts,
it has a duty to make the meaning clear, and if it fails to do so, the insurer, and not the insured, must
suffer.”); RPM Pizza, Inc. v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So.2d 1366, 1369 (La. 1992) (“[A]ny ambiguity
must be construed against the insurance company and in favor of the reasonable construction that
affords coverage.”); Am. Bumper and Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 550 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Mich.
1996) (“[I]n construing insurance contracts, any ambiguities are strictly construed against the insurer to
maximize coverage.”); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 210 A.2d 221, 226 (N.J. 1965) (“If the
controlling language will support two meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to
the insured, the interpretation sustaining coverage must be applied.”) (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident &
Cas. Ins. Co, of Winterthur, Switz., 170 A.2d 800, 803–04 (N.J. 1961)); Gomolka v. State Auto Mut.
Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1347, 1348-49 (Ohio 1982) (“Policies of insurance, which are in language selected
by the insurer and which are reasonably open to different interpretations, will be construed most
favorably for the insured.”) (quoting Home Indem. Co. v. Village of Plymouth, 64 N.E.2d 248, 250
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whether policy language is ambiguous is whether the provisions at
issue are reasonably or fairly susceptible to different interpretations
or meanings.143 If the policyholder and insurer both offer reasonable
interpretations of the policy language, then the policy language is
ambiguous and should be construed in favor of coverage.144 Where
the controversy involves a phrase that the insurers have failed to
define and has generated many lawsuits with varying results,
common sense dictates that the policy language must be
ambiguous.145
(Ohio 1945)); ELIZABETH K. AINSLIE ET AL., BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE
§ 2.02(1) (2013); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES § 1.03(c), at 28–30 (9th ed. 1998); 2 ERIC M. HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 6.1, at 132–33 (2d ed. 1996); 2 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
§ 16.06 (Supp. 1988); RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 120, § 22:14; JEFFREY W. STEMPEL
INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND
POLICYHOLDERS § 5.1, at 173 (1994); David B. Goodwin, Disputing Insurance Coverage Disputes, 43
STAN. L. REV. 779, 795–96 (1991) (reviewing BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN,
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES (3d ed. 1990)).
143. HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 142, § 6.1, at 169 (insurer has burden of establishing that
insurer’s interpretation is the only fair interpretation of contract); LONG, supra note 142, § 16.06, at 16–
32. See also New Castle Cnty. Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d 744, 750 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“‘The settled test for ambiguity is whether the provisions in controversy are reasonably or
fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.’”) (quoting
New Castle Cnty. Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 174 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 1999));
Shepard v. Calfarm Life Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428, 432–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding a policy
provision is ambiguous when more than one construction exists and the burden of proving one
reasonable construction falls to the insurer); High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 476
(N.H. 1994) (“If the language of the policy reasonably may be interpreted more than one way and one
interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists in the policy that will be construed in favor of the
insured and against the insurer.”); Salem Grp. v. Oliver, 607 A.2d 138, 139 (N.J. 1992) (“When a policy
fairly supports an interpretation favorable to both the insured and the insurer, the policy should be
interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Harris, Jolliff & Michel, Inc. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 255
N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (finding that where insurer and insured each present reasonable
interpretations of exclusion, exclusion is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured);
Bartlett v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 45, 47 (R.I. 1991) (noting ambiguity if clause has more than
one reasonable meaning); Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992) (“The court must adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long as
the construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to be more
reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”).
144. Bonner, 841 S.W.2d at 506.
145. New Castle Cnty. Del., 243 F.3d at 756 (finding ambiguity where the contested phrase was not
defined and had been interpreted differently by various courts); Sec. Ins. Co. v. Investors Diversified
Ltd., 407 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The insurance company contends that the
language is not ambiguous, but we cannot agree and offer as proof of that pudding the fact that the
Supreme Court of California and the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans have arrived at opposite conclusions
from a study of essentially the same language.”); Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900,
908 (Kan. 1989) (“[R]eported cases are in conflict, the trial judge and the Court of Appeals reached
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Further, because insurers seek to invoke the valuation provisions
as a way of limiting the amount of coverage to be provided for losses
that are unquestionably insured, the language should be viewed as
akin to an exclusion, which means: (1) it should be narrowly
construed against the insurer, and (2) the insurer has the burden of
proving its applicability.146 Indeed, numerous courts have held that
exclusions will not be interpreted and applied in such a way as to
swallow the basic coverages provided under a policy.147 So how does
contra proferentem apply in the context of interpreting and applying
the valuation provisions in business interruption insurance? As is
discussed above and below in Part IV, an ambiguous insurance
policy provision is one that has more than one reasonable meaning.148
Thus, when one attempts to interpret and apply the valuation
different conclusions and the justices of this court [disagree] . . . . Under such circumstances, the clause
is, by definition, ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (“Since we assume that all
courts adopt a reasonable construction, the conflict is of itself indicative that the word as so used is
susceptible of at least two reasonable interpretations, one of which extends the coverage to the situation
at hand.”); George H. Olmsted & Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 161 N.E. 276, 276 (Ohio 1928) (“Where
the language of a clause used in an insurance contract is such that courts of numerous jurisdictions have
found it necessary to construe it and in such construction have arrived at conflicting conclusions as to
the correct meaning, intent and effect thereof, the question whether such clause is ambiguous ceases to
be an open one.”); Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The mere fact
that [courts differ on the construction of the provision] itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the
provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation.”). See generally Charles C. Marvel,
Annotation, Division of Opinion Among Judges on Same Court or Among Other Courts or Jurisdictions
Considering Same Question, as Evidence that Particular Clause of Insurance Policy is Ambiguous, 4
A.L.R. 4TH 1253 (1981).
146. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 1995) (insurer has burden to
prove the applicability of an exclusion as an affirmative defense); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Louis Marx & Co.,
415 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ohio 1980) (defense has burden of proving defense based upon exclusion); Brown
v. Snohomish Cnty. Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334, 340 (Wash. 1993) (once insured has made a prima
facie case that there is coverage, burden shifts to the insurer to prove an exclusionary provision applies).
See also HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 142, § 6.1, at 139–42; RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 120,
§ 22:31.
147. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding
policy excluding acts explicitly covered in prior section of policy is construed against insurer); Alstrin v.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 390 (D. Del. 2002) (construing ambiguities against
insurer in order to reduce the insurer’s incentive to draft policy language where certain provisions
purport to give coverage while other clauses “take that very coverage away”); Titan Indem. Co. v.
Newton, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (finding coverage even though “the limitations of
[the] policy completely swallow up the insuring provisions”); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375,
1380 (Md. 1997) (finding that “[i]f the exclusion totally swallows the insuring provision,” then such
provisions create the greatest form of ambiguity, and the insurer is obliged to provide coverage).
148. See supra note 143.
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provisions of business interruption insurance—as evidenced by the
fact no loss valuation formula is contained in the provisions, many of
the terms are not defined, and the courts have struggled to even
determine what evidence should be considered when valuing
business interruption losses—it becomes apparent that the provisions
are ambiguous when applied.149 Consequently, they should be
construed against insurers.150
B. The “Reasonable Expectations” Doctrine
Another staple of insurance law is that a policy should be
interpreted in such a way as to fulfill the “reasonable expectations” of
the policyholder.151 A seminal article regarding the “reasonable
expectations” doctrine was written more than forty years ago by then
Professor Robert Keeton.152 In his subsequent treatise, then Judge
Keeton summarized the doctrine as follows:

149. See infra Parts III, IV.
150. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
151. AINSLIE, supra note 142, § 2.02(1)(4); French, supra note 142, at 225–26; ROBERT E. KEETON &
ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a)(3), at 633–34 (1988); LONG, supra note 142, § 16.07, at 1643; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 142, § 1.03(b)(2)(B), at 22–27 (identifying courts in thirty-eight
jurisdictions that have expressed support for, or applied a form of, the reasonable expectations doctrine);
RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 120, § 22.11; STEMPEL, supra note 142, § 11.1, at 312. See also AIU Ins.
Co. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cnty., 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (interpreting ambiguous
coverage clauses of insurance policies broadly to protect the objectively reasonable expectations of the
insured); Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. 1995) (“A contract of
insurance should be strictly construed against the insurer and read in favor of coverage in accordance
with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 533
P.2d 737, 741 (Idaho 1975) (applying reasonable expectations doctrine notwithstanding conclusion that
the provision was unambiguous); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671–73 (N.D.
1977) (holding doctrine of reasonable expectations is properly invoked to discern intentions of parties
and impose liability on insurer); A.B.C. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.H.
1995) (“‘[T]he policy language must be so clear as to create no ambiguity which might affect the
insured’s reasonable expectations.’”) (quoting Cacavas v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 512 A.2d 423, 425
(N.H. 1986)); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 824 P.2d 302, 308 (N.M. 1992) (stating
that courts will give effect to policyholder’s reasonable expectations in construing policy language);
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495–96 (W. Va. 1987) (stating that
courts will apply reasonable expectations doctrine to construe the policy in a manner that a reasonable
person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean, “even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations”) (quoting Robert
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970)).
152. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV.
961, 966–77 (1970).
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In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of
applicants, insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the
coverage afforded by insurance contracts even though a careful
examination of the policy provisions indicates that such
expectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the
insurer.153

As another commentator more recently stated, “In other words, even
when the policy language unambiguously precludes coverage, under
certain circumstances, courts will hold that coverage exists.”154
Stated differently, the policyholder should receive in coverage
what it objectively can reasonably expect to receive even if the
insurer can point to some policy language that supports the insurer’s
position that the claim at issue should not be covered or coverage
should be limited.155 Thus, for example, a policyholder who buys
153. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 151, § 6.3(a)(3), at 633. For commentary regarding the
reasonable expectations doctrine, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made
Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); Roger
C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 823 (1990) (providing a detailed historical account of the doctrine and asserting that the doctrine
is principled and can be applied within justifiable guidelines); Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract,
and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 21 (1998) (discussing the doctrine
as conceptualized by Keeton); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled
Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 287–96 (1986) (formulating standards for applying the doctrine);
Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing
for refinements to the doctrine in response to the fading appeal that the doctrine holds for courts and
commentators and contending that courts should “discard their unfortunate tendency to speak the
platitudes of reasonable expectations without undertaking a careful and systematic analysis”); Daniel
Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1389, 1395 (2007) (criticizing the reasonable expectations doctrine and arguing that the
case law endorsing the doctrine is “confused and inconsistent”). While there is relatively broad
acceptance of the doctrine, judicial interpretation and application of the doctrine is variable. See Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the
Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 191 (1998) (describing judicial
approaches and noting both liberal and narrow approaches among the numerous states that have adopted
the doctrine); Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000) (exploring judicial responses and proposing a
middle ground approach).
154. Francis J. Mootz, III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 52 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1, 22, (1997).
155. The reasonable expectations doctrine is rooted in the fact that insurance policies generally are
contracts of adhesion drafted by insurers and offered to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. See,
e.g., KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 151, at 967; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629, 632 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff,
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business interruption insurance to protect its earnings stream against
business interruptions caused by catastrophic perils, such as
hurricanes and tornadoes, reasonably can expect that it will be
reimbursed for its lost business earnings when a hurricane or tornado
interrupts its business.
So what does this mean in the context of valuing business
interruption loss claims? As is discussed below in Part IV, because
the valuation provisions are, at best, ambiguous, one arguably does
not even need to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine. The
ambiguities in the language should be construed in favor of the
policyholder.156 Nonetheless, even if the provisions were somehow
viewed as unambiguous, a policyholder who buys business
interruption insurance reasonably can expect to receive from its
insurer, for the period of interruption, the business earnings it had
been receiving prior to the catastrophe. In other words, courts should
not permit insurers to accept premiums for business interruption
insurance, but then, when a claim is presented, pay the policyholder
nothing or only a fraction of its business interruption loss. To do so
would render the coverage provided to the business owner under the
policy illusory, which is impermissible.157

Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226 (1983); Schwarcz,
supra note 153, at 1401–02; Peter Nash Swisher, Symposium Introduction, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 5 (1998)
(introducing the Association of American Law Schools program entitled “The Insurance Law Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations After Three Decades”).
156. Consol. Cos. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-4700, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *25 (E.D. La.
Jan. 23, 2009) (citing La. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 616 So. 2d
1250, 1252 (La. 1993)).
157. See supra note 147. See also Bowersox Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co., 209
F.3d 273, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting insurer’s interpretation of policy’s two-year limitation period
where interpretation would have rendered coverage illusory); Harris v. Gulf Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d
1220, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting insurer’s interpretation of exclusion in policy because it “would
render the coverage provided by the policy illusory”); Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp.
2d 376, 398 (D. Del. 2002) (rejecting a D&O insurer’s interpretation of the policy’s deliberate fraud
exclusion where, if applied, “there would be little or nothing left to that coverage” because “[n]o insured
would expect such limited coverage from a policy that purports to cover all types of securities fraud
claims”); Atofina Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 185 S.W.3d 440, 444–45 (Tex. 2005)
(rejecting insurer’s interpretation of additional insured endorsement because it “would render coverage
under the endorsement largely illusory”).
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C. Construction of the Policy as a Whole
Another policy interpretation principle applicable to the valuation
of business interruption losses “provides that, if possible, the policy
should be interpreted in a way that reconciles [the] various provisions
[of the policy] and attempts to give effect to all of [the provisions]”
while keeping the general purpose of the insurance in mind.158 In the
context of business interruption insurance, this means that the courts
should interpret the various components of the valuation provisions
in light of the purpose of business interruption insurance. As is
discussed above, the basic purpose of business interruption insurance
is to protect the policyholder from lost earnings during periods of
interruption.159 If that purpose is not fulfilled when the policy
language at issue is interpreted and applied, then the insurance
coverage purchased may impermissibly become illusory.160
IV. HOW BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES SHOULD BE VALUED
In this part of the Article, the problems with the courts’ various
approaches to interpreting and applying the policy language
regarding the valuation of business interruption losses are discussed.
Then, an interpretation regarding the existing valuation language
under the rules of policy interpretation is offered. Finally, a proposal
158. French, supra note 142, at 227. See also O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4) (West 2010) (contracts should be
interpreted as a whole); Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1985)
(“[A]n interpretation that gives a reasonable and effective meaning to all the terms of a contract is
generally preferred to one that leaves a part unreasonable or of no effect[.]”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. 146, 155–56 (Ct. App. 1991) (“In short, an insurance contract is to be
construed in a manner which gives meaning to all its provisions in a natural, reasonable, and practical
manner, having reference to the risk and subject matter and to the purposes of the entire contract.”)
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crane 217 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1132 (Ct. App. 1990)); Barrett
v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 220 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Ct. App. 1985) (“The [insurance contract] is to be
construed in a manner which gives a reasonable meaning to all its provision in a natural, reasonable and
praticalmanner, [sic] having reference to the risk and subject matter and to the purposes of the entire
contract.”) (quoting Home Indem. Co. v. Leo L. Davis, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 863, 869 (Ct. App. 1978));
Weiss v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 319 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ill. 1974) (provisions in an insurance policy
should be interpreted in context of entire policy); Welborn v. Ill. Nat. Cas. Co., 106 N.E.2d 142, 143 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1952) (“[T]he court should determine the intention from the whole agreement, and endeavor to
give a meaning to all provisions, so far as possible, which will render them consistent and operative.”).
159. See supra note 6.
160. See supra notes 147, 157. See also discussion infra Part IV.
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regarding how business interruption losses should be valued in the
future is presented.
A. The Problems with the Existing Framework
There are numerous problems with the existing valuation language
in business interruption policies. Consequently, the courts’ attempts
to apply this language has resulted in a body of case law that is
inconsistent, unpredictable, and leads to the inefficient resolution of
business interruption claims.
1. Business Interruption Loss Valuations are Inherently
Speculative so They Cannot be Proven with “Reasonable
Certainty”
As an initial matter, because valuing a business interruption loss is
an inherently speculative exercise under the existing policy language,
the courts should not be requiring policyholders to prove to a
reasonable degree of certainty the amount the policyholder would
have earned during the period of interruption.161 To do so imposes an
arguably insurmountable evidentiary burden on the policyholder
under the current valuation language.162 A business interruption loss
calculation under the existing policy language is a hypothetical
exercise—a projection. One cannot prove what would have happened
with “reasonable certainty” if a business’s operation had not been
interrupted. No one knows with reasonable, or unreasonable,
certainty what would have happened. If people could predict the
future with reasonable certainty, many accidents and catastrophes
could and would be avoided.
Indeed, the notion that a policyholder should be able to appear in
court and demonstrate exactly how many orders it would have
received if its business had been operational is not grounded in
reality. When a business is shut down, the orders stop coming as soon
as customers learn of the interruption. Customers do not call the
161. See supra Part II.D.
162. Id.
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policyholder and say, “if your business were still operating, I would
have ordered X widgets.” The phones simply stop ringing. The
customers take their business elsewhere.
Consequently, policyholders typically do not have documentation
of “lost” orders. Nor can or would most policyholders present
customers at trial who would testify that they would have ordered a
specific amount of product or services if the business had been
operational. Customers do not keep track of orders they do not place.
Thus, requiring policyholders to prove such matters to a “reasonable
degree of certainty” is simply inconsistent with the way the business
world works and, in many instances, is impossible.
Moreover, it would be bad business for a policyholder to even
attempt to do so. How many customers voluntarily will want to
interrupt their professional and personal lives to go to court and
testify in an insurance dispute that does not even involve them?
Because very few people are interested in putting aside their personal
and professional obligations in order to subject themselves to cross
examination, it would be bad business for a policyholder to even ask
its customers to do so. So what then? Should the policyholder
subpoena its uncooperative customers to testify? Doing so may
provide the policyholder with a pyrrhic victory163 of winning the
lawsuit against its insurer but losing its customers.
Putting aside the problems such an evidentiary standard presents
for the policyholder, how should a jury even attempt to apply a
“reasonable degree of certainty” standard to what is indisputably a
hypothetical situation? Indeed, in other contexts where the damages
at issue are inherently speculative, such as the valuation of lost
goodwill, some courts use a relaxed evidentiary standard of proof
where only the fact of damages, but not the amount, must be proven
to a reasonable degree of certainty.164 For all of these reasons, courts
163. See generally PLUTARCH, Life of Pyrrhus, in IX PLUTARCH’S LIVES 363 (Bernadotte Perrin
trans. 1920). The phrase is named after King Pyrrhus of Epirus, whose army suffered irreplaceable
casualties in defeating the Romans at Heraclea in 280 BC and Asculum in 279 BC during the Pyrrhic
War. Id.
164. Although damages of lost goodwill technically must be proven to a reasonable degree of
certainty, “‘the doctrine respecting the matter of certainty, properly applied, is concerned more with the
fact of damage than with the extent or amount of damage.’” Lewis River Golf, Inc. v. O.M. Scott &
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should not require policyholders to prove with “reasonable certainty”
what their earnings and costs would have been in the fictional,
hypothetical world in which the business interruption did not occur.
Instead, as is discussed below in Part IV.C., the loss calculation
should be done under fixed formulas that do not require the parties,
court, or jury to conduct a “what if” analysis.
2. Using Only the Policyholder’s Historical Financial
Information to Value Business Interruption Losses Ignores Some
of the Valuation Policy Language
In addition, the line of cases, with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Finger Furniture165 being the leading example, in which the courts
only allow the policyholder’s historical financial information to be
considered when business interruption losses are calculated, is based
upon a selective reading of the valuation language in business
interruption policies.166 The reasoning of the courts in these cases is
that, “[t]he strongest and most reliable evidence of what a business
would have done had the catastrophe not occurred is what it had been
doing in the period just before the interruption.”167 Agreed, but the
policy language does not say that.
The valuation provisions provide that “due consideration shall be
given to the experience of the business before the date of the damage
or destruction and to the probable experience thereafter had no loss
occurred.”168 Why would insurers include the italicized language if
they really meant that only the experience of the policyholder before
the catastrophe should be used to value the loss? If that is what the
insurers intended, then it would have been simple enough for the
policies to state, “when valuing the loss, only the historical
performance of the policyholder shall be considered.”
Sons, 845 P.2d 987, 990 (Wash. 1993) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gaasland Co., Inc. v. Hyak Lumber
& Millwork, Inc. 257 P.2d 784, 788 (Wash. 1953)). Damages for lost good will are “not subject to proof
of mathematical certainty,” and consequently, they only have to be proven “‘with whatever definiteness
and accuracy the facts permit, but no more.’” Id. (quoting Official UCC Comment, § 1–106).
165. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co, 404 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2005).
166. See supra Part II.A.
167. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
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Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the existing policy
language to mean only the historical performance of the policyholder
shall be considered.169 Under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, the
“probable experience had no loss occurred” language is superfluous
or, at best, redundant.170 Thus, by essentially overriding that policy
language, the Fifth Circuit has violated one of the bedrock principles
of insurance policy interpretation—that all provisions in the policy
should be given effect and construed harmoniously if possible with
the purpose of the insurance in mind.171 Further, and worse, by
construing the language against policyholders in situations where the
post-catastrophe economic conditions are favorable to the
policyholder, the Fifth Circuit also has violated the fundamental
doctrine of policy interpretation, contra proferentem, which dictates
that ambiguities in policy language shall be construed in favor of
policyholders.172
With that said, by rendering the “probable experience had no loss
occurred” language essentially meaningless, the Fifth Circuit has
simplified the loss valuation analysis because it eliminated one of the
issues most hotly contested—what impact the post-catastrophe
economic conditions would have had on the policyholder’s business
if the policyholder’s business had not been interrupted.173 The postcatastrophe economic conditions for a policyholder can be either
greatly enhanced or reduced depending upon the nature of the
policyholder’s business. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, there
was little demand for restaurants on Bourbon Street in New Orleans
because tourists stopped going to New Orleans until the area had
recovered.174 Thus, if one were to consider the post-catastrophe
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See discussion supra Part III.C.
172. See discussions supra Part III.A and infra Part IV.B.
173. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314.
174. See, e.g., Russell McCulley, Will Bourbon Street Bring the Tourists Back to New Orleans?, TIME
(Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1334012,00.html (“Though the areas
of most interest to visitors got through Katrina pretty much intact, the haunting images (including
tourists trapped in hotels) and constant media attention left over from Katrina has kept the bulk of
sightseers from returning.”); Kim Severson, New Orleans Watch: Restaurant Reopenings, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/18/travel/18webfood.html (“Without tourists, New
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economic conditions for restaurants in New Orleans when valuing his
business interruption losses, then such restaurants likely would have
had little, if any, business interruption losses because there would not
have been many customers patronizing the restaurants even if the
restaurants had been operational.
On the other hand, as evidenced by the case law discussed in Part
II.B., there was great demand for housing in the New Orleans area
after Hurricane Katrina.175 Consequently, the rental value of
apartments increased post-catastrophe.176 Thus, if a policyholder
were able to use the higher rental rates when valuing its business
interruption loss, then its recovery for its business interruption loss
would be higher than it would have been if the policyholder’s
business had not been interrupted.177
In addition, by eliminating consideration of the post-catastrophe
economic conditions, the Fifth Circuit also effectively eliminated the
need for expert witnesses to opine regarding the impact the state of
the economy would have had on the policyholder’s business during
the period of interruption.178 Indeed, since the 2008 financial
meltdown, it has been common for insurers to contend policyholders
that suffered a business interruption in the past few years did not
actually suffer a loss due to the interruption because they would have
been operating at a loss even if their businesses had not been
interrupted.179 Thus, by limiting the relevant evidence allowed to
value business interruption losses to the pre-loss time period, the
state of the economy during the period of interruption becomes
irrelevant under the Fifth Circuit’s approach.
In short, although the Fifth Circuit should be lauded for attempting
to simplify business interruption loss calculations, the way the Fifth

Orleans is losing more than $15 million a day in direct revenue, according to the governor’s office.”).
175. See supra note 67.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314.
179. See, e.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 09-CV-13-LRR, 2010
WL 2509985, at *11 (N.D. Iowa June 17, 2010) (allowing insurers’ expert to offer an opinion regarding
the effect the recession would have had on the policyholder’s business during the period of interruption).
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Circuit has done so is inconsistent with the existing valuation policy
language and the rules of policy interpretation.
3. Consideration of the Post-Catastrophe Economic Conditions
Can Lead to Unfair Results and Factual Disputes That Must be
Tried
Also, allowing the post-loss economic conditions to be considered
when valuing business interruption losses often creates: (1) windfall
gains or unfair losses for the policyholder and (2) factual disputes
because the parties often do not agree on the state of the economy or
its impact on the policyholder’s business.
If the result in a case is that the policyholder obtains a windfall
gain or an unfair loss, then the legal system has failed in that case. As
is discussed above, the purpose of business interruption insurance is
to place the policyholder in the same position it would have been if
its business had not been interrupted.180 Often times, however, the
catastrophe that causes the business interruption changes the
economy in the area of the catastrophe. Consequently, when the postcatastrophe economic conditions are considered when calculating the
policyholder’s business interruption loss, the policyholder may
receive a windfall gain or an unfairly low loss valuation.
Again, the New Orleans area following Hurricane Katrina is a
prime example of this phenomenon. As previously noted, certain
businesses, such as restaurants in the French Quarter, had very little
business immediately following Hurricane Katrina because tourists
stopped going to New Orleans.181 If the post-catastrophe economic
conditions of New Orleans were considered in valuing restaurants’
business interruption losses after the hurricane passed, then they
arguably had little or no losses because there was little or no demand
for their services. It obviously would be unfair; however, if no
business interruption loss payments were made to restaurants,
because they clearly suffered massive losses due to Hurricane
Katrina and they were not in the same position they would have been
180. See supra note 6.
181. McCulley, supra note 174.
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had Hurricane Katrina missed New Orleans. Thus, by considering the
post-catastrophe economic conditions in that situation, the purpose of
business interruption insurance would not be fulfilled.
Conversely, the demand in the housing market in southern
Louisiana increased after Hurricane Katrina.182 Thus, if a landlord’s
business interruption losses following Hurricane Katrina were
calculated using the post-Katrina rental values, then the landlord
would receive a windfall gain because it would be placed in a better
position than it would have been if no disaster had occurred and its
business had not been interrupted. Indeed, the landlord would
actually recover more for the period of interruption than it would
have if no catastrophe had occurred.
In addition, the factual disputes that arise when discussing the state
of the post-catastrophe economy increases the chances a case will
need to be tried,183 which places an unnecessary burden on the legal
system. If a case has to be tried, it often means the outcome of the
case is unpredictable because the parties would settle if they agreed
on the outcome of the trial.184 As evidenced by the tapestry of
inconsistent decisions discussed above in Part III.C., the outcomes of

182. See, e.g., Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 973 So.2d 39, 57 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
183. See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2308 (2010) (“[S]ummary judgment is
appropriate where there ‘is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and the moving party is ‘entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)); Montgomery v. Barrow, 692 S.E.2d
351, 353 (Ga. 2010) (“[T]he moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant
judgment as a matter of law.”) (quoting Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 405 S.E.2d 474, 475 (Ga. 1991)); UT
Med. Grp., Inc. v. Vogt, 235 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tenn. 2007) (“[A] grant of summary judgment is
appropriate only when (1) there is no genuine issue with regard to the material facts . . . , and (2) based
on undisputed facts, ‘the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”) (quoting TENN. R.
CIV. P. 56.04)).
184. Cf. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60 (1996) (“The trials that occur, nonetheless, are primarily in cases in
which the parties remain so far apart in their predictions of the decision on liability that they are willing
to gamble on a jury’s notoriously unpredictable verdict.”); Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for
Settlement: Theory and Practice, J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (1991) (“[I]f . . . a plaintiff values a case too high
or the defendant too low, settlement becomes difficult or impossible. At a minimum, this prolongs
negotiations and unnecessarily consumes the parties’ and lawyers’ time and resources. At worst, matters
that should have been settled proceed to trial, placing heavy burdens on the court system and the
parties.”).
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disputes regarding the valuation of business interruption losses under
the existing case law are unpredictable.185
Further, if a dispute arising from a contract (e.g., the insurance
policy in this instance) has to be tried because the outcome of a trial
is unpredictable, then one of the principal purposes of the contract
also has failed. In addition to allowing the parties to memorialize
their respective obligations, one of the principal purposes of contracts
is to allow the parties to predict the results in the event of a breach by
one of the parties.186 The necessity of a trial in a breach of contract
dispute suggests that the predictive power of the contract, in this
situation standard form policy language, is poor.
In short, if a case has to be tried, then a greater burden is placed on
the legal system because the case has to proceed through discovery,
motions practice, and trial at great expense to the parties, courts, and
jurors.187 Consequently, an interpretation of policy language that
unnecessarily results in trials is costly to the legal system; and thus,
the policy language or the interpretation of it, should be changed.
B. How Business Interruption Losses Should be Valued Under the
Existing Policy Language

185. See supra Part III.C.
186. MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ & DENISE RIEBE, CONTRACTS: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE
CASEBOOK 5 (2009) (“[P]redictability promotes our free market economy by providing certainty for
those involved in exchanging goods and services. If a merchant knows the legal consequences of her
negotiating efforts or of the language she selects for her contracts, she can act accordingly. This
predictability encourages people to enter into contracts, secure in the knowledge that those contracts will
be enforced.”); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000) (“Long-term contracts raise a straightforward, but seemingly
intractable problem: in the long term events are so hard to predict, that parties will not be able to allocate
future obligations and payments in a way that maximizes the value of their contract.”).
187. See, e.g., Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Settlement
agreements are to be encouraged because they promote the amicable resolution of disputes and lighten
the increasing load of litigation faced by the federal courts. In addition to the conservation of judicial
resources, the parties may also gain significantly from avoiding the costs and risks of a lengthy and
complex trial.”) (citation omitted); Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th
Cir. 1994) (“We favor and encourage settlements in order to conserve judicial resources.”); Miller v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 155 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Mont. 2007) (“The declared public policy of this
State is to encourage settlement and avoid unnecessary litigation . . . Settlement eliminates cost, stress,
and waste of judicial resources.”).
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1. Applying the Rules of Policy Interpretation to Loss Valuation
Language
Under the existing rules of policy interpretation, the postcatastrophe economic conditions should be considered when they
favor the policyholder and ignored when they do not.188 Heads the
policyholder wins, tails the insurer loses. How can that be right?
Simply stated, the existing valuation language in business
interruption policies is ambiguous. Thus, the language should be
construed in favor of policyholders because insurers drafted it.189
Consider again the relevant policy language that states how a
business interruption loss should be calculated:
[D]ue consideration shall be given to the experience of the
business before the date of the damage or destruction and to the
probable experience thereafter had no loss occurred.190

No formula for calculating business interruption losses is set forth.
Nor does the language state how one should determine what the
policyholder’s “probable experience thereafter” would have been.
Because the policy is silent on that issue, it is open to multiple
interpretations. The policyholder may think its “probable” experience
was going to be great because it had some great marketing ideas it
had intended to implement. Should the policyholder’s marketing
ideas be part of the loss equation? If so, who and how do you value
them? The policyholder also may have been projecting growth in its
industry or had a new product it planned to introduce that it expected
would be well received by the market. Are these factors that should
be part of the loss equation under this policy language? The policy
does not address such matters. To the contrary, the language is
intentionally open-ended and vague.
Similarly, what does the phrase “had no loss occurred” mean?
Does it mean: (1) had the catastrophe not occurred, (2) had the
188. See supra Part III.
189. See supra Part III.A.
190. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co, 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005).
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interruption of the policyholder’s business not occurred (but ignore
whether the catastrophe changed the demand for the policyholder’s
services or product), or (3) had the business interruption of the
policyholder not occurred (but consider the impact the catastrophe
had on the demand for the policyholder’s services or product)? It is
unclear what the answers to these questions are under the existing
policy language. Thus, because it is open to multiple reasonable
interpretations, the language is ambiguous.
These ambiguities are highlighted by the fact that courts have
interpreted the same or similar business interruption loss valuation
policy language and reached opposite conclusions regarding its
meaning.191 On the one hand, the Fifth Circuit, for example, has
interpreted the language to only allow for the consideration of the
policyholder’s historical financial information when valuing the loss.
192
On the other hand, the state courts in Louisiana have interpreted
the language to allow for the consideration of post-catastrophe
economic conditions when valuing the loss.193 When two conflicting
interpretations are both reasonable, the policy language must be
ambiguous.194
Hornbook insurance law dictates that ambiguous policy language
should be construed in favor of the policyholder and against the
insurer.195 That means the post-catastrophe economic conditions
should be considered if they are favorable to the policyholder. If the
post-catastrophe economic conditions are unfavorable to the
policyholder, then they should not be considered.
Further, the reasonable expectations doctrine also dictates that the
post-catastrophe economic conditions should not be considered if the
demand for the policyholder’s products or services was negatively
impacted by the catastrophe.196 A policyholder does not reasonably
191. See supra Parts II.A. and II.B.
192. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314.
193. See, e.g., Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 973 So. 2d 39, 57 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
194. Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
195. See supra Part III.A.
196. The reasonable expectations doctrine does not, however, dictate that the post-catastrophe
economic conditions be considered if it would result in the policyholder receiving a windfall. See
discussion supra Part III.B. In most contexts, policyholders will be hard pressed to credibly argue that
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expect to find itself in a situation where its business has been
interrupted but no “loss” has occurred for insurance purposes simply
because the area near its business also was destroyed and thus there is
little or no demand for the policyholder’s services or products postcatastrophe. A policyholder reasonably expects that, after paying
premiums for business interruption insurance,197 it will be paid
something when its business is interrupted.198 If the policy language
were construed in such a way that the post-catastrophe conditions
would be considered in situations where there was little or no
demand for the policyholder’s services or products due to the
catastrophe (and thus, according to some insurers, no business
interruption loss actually occurred), then the reasonable expectations
of the policyholder would not be fulfilled. Indeed, no policyholder
would reasonably expect that if a disaster destroys its business and
the area near its business, then its insurance would become worthless.
To the contrary, one of the primary reasons a policyholder purchases
insurance such as business interruption insurance is to cover losses
caused by disasters.
Again, Hurricane Katrina is a good example to illustrate the point.
Many of the policyholders’ restaurants were profitable before the
hurricane.199 Then, there was an interruption in their businesses
caused by the hurricane. In such circumstances, the policyholders
reasonably expected they would be covered. Indeed, why would a
policyholder whose business is located in a tourist town on the Gulf
Coast, which is known for selling a drink called “the Hurricane,”200
buy business interruption insurance if the insurance would not cover
they reasonably expected their business interruption insurance would provide recoveries greater than
their historical earnings simply because a disaster occurs. Id.
197. Insurers, of course, make money by collecting more in premiums than they pay in claims and by
investing the premiums until claims are paid. Eliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the
Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422–23 (1988)
(“Insurers do not simply hang onto premiums, of course; they invest them for the time period between
payment of premiums and payment of losses. . . . The role of investment income in the [insurance]
industry is particularly important. Studies have concluded that investment income allows the industry to
remain profitable as a whole even with significant negative underwriting losses.”).
198. See supra Part III.B.
199. See McCulley, supra note 174.
200. Keith I. Marszalek, Home of the “Hurricane” Pat O’Brien’s Turns 75 This Week, NOLA.COM
(Nov. 30, 2008, 4:47 PM), http://blog.nola.com/anguslind/2008/11/pat_os_turns_75_this_week.html.
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the loss of earnings caused by hurricanes that prevent tourists from
going to the area?
Similarly, the policy interpretation rule which provides that all of
the provisions of a policy should be interpreted in a harmonious way
that gives effect to the primary purpose of the insurance also dictates
a result favorable to policyholders.201 The purpose of business
interruption insurance is to transfer the risk of a loss of earnings due
to business interruptions from the policyholder to the insurer.202
Indeed, business interruption insurance’s primary purpose is to
maintain the policyholder’s revenue stream during periods of
interruption such that the policyholder will be returned to the same
position it would have been had no business interruption occurred.203
Thus, with these primary purposes of the insurance in mind, the
valuation language should be interpreted in a way that ensures the
policyholder will be made whole, which means the post-catastrophe
economic conditions should not be considered if doing so would
result in the policyholder effectively becoming uninsured for its loss
of earnings following a catastrophe.
2. Analyzing the Loss Valuation Policy Language as a “Defective
Product”
In recent years, some scholars have advanced the theory that
because policies are non-negotiated contracts of adhesion with
standardized language drafted by insurers and are sold on a take-itor-leave-it basis, policies should be viewed as akin to products or
“things” rather than simply contracts.204 This theory is further
supported by the fact that policyholders often do not receive a copy
of the policy itself until many months after it was purchased and they
rarely read the many pages and terms of the policy when it finally is
received.205 Consequently, most policyholders are not even aware of
201. See supra Part III.C.
202. See supra Part I.A.
203. See supra note 6.
204. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 153, at 1389; Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as a
Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813, 835 (2009).
205. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 151, § 6.3, at 634; Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of
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what the specific language is in the policies.206 Even policyholders
who attempt to review the pages and pages of terms and conditions
set forth in the policy likely do not understand them due to the length
and complexity of the language used.207
Further, the insurance industry routinely refers to insurance
policies as “products” that are researched, designed, marketed, and
sold like manufactured goods.208 Similarly, the purchasers of
insurance also consider insurance a “good” and brand loyalty for
insurance products is very high.209
When a policy is viewed as a product, the “reasonable
expectations” doctrine and contra proferentem can be understood as
judicially created contractual interpretation tools that courts apply in
order to attempt to ensure that policyholders actually receive the
product they thought they were purchasing.210 Instead of applying
those interpretive tools to what can be viewed as a contract in name
only, policies instead can be viewed as products. As a product, the
question to be answered is whether the product that was sold is
defective because it fails to perform as reasonably expected by the
purchaser of the product—the policyholder. Of course, if a product is
defective, then the seller of the product—the insurer—is responsible
for any harm or damage caused by the product.211
In the business interruption context, when a policyholder
purchases a business interruption policy it reasonably expects to be
paid the full amount of its loss less the deductible in the event that its
business is interrupted. If the loss valuation language allows the
insurer to pay nothing or less than the full amount of the loss in the
event of a business interruption, then the policy is defective from the
policyholder’s perspective. Consequently, the policyholder is injured

Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 660 (2013).
206. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 151, § 6.3, at 634; Abraham, supra note 205, at 660.
207. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 151, § 6.3, at 634; Abraham, supra note 205, at 660.
208. Stempel, supra note 204, at 831.
209. Id. at 832.
210. Id. at 831.
211. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (“One engaged in the
business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”).
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by the defective product in so far as it suffers an uncompensated loss
and cannot retroactively buy an insurance policy to cover the
unreimbursed portion of the loss. Under strict liability principles
applicable to injuries caused by defective products, the seller of the
defective product—the insurer—is liable for the injuries caused by its
product.212 Thus, the insurer would be liable to the policyholder,
under a products liability theory, for the amount of the policyholder’s
loss that the policy does not cover.
Does such an approach lead to a different result than when the
reasonable expectations doctrine and contra proferentem are applied
to the loss valuation language? No. Under both approaches, the
insurer is legally responsible for ensuring that the product it sells—
the policy—fulfills the reasonable expectations of the purchaser of
the product regarding the performance of the product. Considering
policies as products, instead of contracts, however, is another way of
analyzing the issue that confirms accuracy of the result under the
traditional rules of policy interpretation.
C. Proposed Loss Valuation Formulas That are Based Upon the
Original Purpose of Business Interruption Insurance and Which
Provide Consistent, Predictable Results and the Efficient Resolution
of Claims
In this part, two proposed formulas for calculating business
interruption losses are set forth and the public policy considerations
associated with the payment of business interruption losses are
analyzed. These proposals initially are intended for insurers, the
drafters of policy language, because redrafting the policy language to
incorporate either one of the proposals should eliminate many, if not
all, of the disputes addressed in this Article that exist under the
current policy language.213 If insurers fail to adopt one of the
proposals, however, then courts and legislatures should act to ensure
that the way business interruption losses are calculated changes.

212. Id. § 1 cmt. a.
213. See supra Part II.
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1. A Stated Daily Loss Value Set Forth in the Policy or Only the
Policyholder’s Prior Three Years of Historical Earnings and
Expenses Should be Used When Valuing Business Interruption
Losses
Simply stated, to eliminate the problems with the existing policy
language discussed in this Article, either a stated daily loss value or
only the prior three years of the policyholder’s historical earnings and
cost information should be used to calculate business interruption
losses. More specifically, the policies should contain a stated daily
loss value for business interruption losses, just as the original “use
and occupancy” policies did for lost rents.214 A daily loss value is the
amount of loss a business suffers each day its business’s operations
are suspended.215 During the annual policy renewal process, a
policyholder provides a business interruption loss projection to the
insurer’s underwriters that is based upon the policyholder’s current
budget, revenue, and cost data that the insurer then uses to: (1)
evaluate the insured risk, (2) calculate a daily loss value, and (3) in
part, establish the amount of the premium.216 These same daily loss
value figures could and should be used to calculate the loss in the
event of a business interruption. Indeed, under disability insurance,
which is analogous to business interruption insurance in that it
insures a person for the income the person loses during time periods
when the person is unable to work due to injury or illness, the
amounts to be paid to the policyholder in the event of a disability are
expressly stated in the policy and usually are a percentage of the
policyholder’s income.217
Using a stated daily loss value or a three-year time period of
historical earnings and costs would eliminate arguments about
whether earnings and costs were trending up or down before the
business interruption or whether the policyholder’s recent results
214. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 6.
215. Id. at 5.
216. Johnson & O’Toole, supra note 18, at 65 (discussing how most policyholders are required to
submit business interruption values as a part of the initial underwriting, and insurers will use the values
to measure, inter alia, basis for annual premiums, deductibles, limits, and daily value deductibles).
217. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 430 (5th ed. 2010).
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were anomalous.218 Using a stated daily loss value or a three-year
time period of historical financial results also would account for the
state of the economy without the necessity of speculating about what
the future would have held. As the Fifth Circuit has stated, “the
strongest and most reliable evidence of what a business would have
done had the catastrophe not occurred is what it had been doing in
the period just before the interruption.”219 The loss valuation policy
language should be changed to reflect that reality.
The cost savings for the legal system should be significant under
either of these proposals. Under these proposals, the parties would
not need to hire experts to debate the state of the economy. Nor
would they need to hire experts to opine on the industry trends for the
policyholder’s business. Instead, the loss calculation would be a
simple mathematical calculation in which the number of days the
business was interrupted is multiplied by either the daily loss value
contained in the policy or the historical average daily earnings and
expenses. Thus, instead of hiring expensive forensic accountants to
fight about the policyholder’s “probable” experience during the
period of interruption, the policyholder or its accountant easily could
do the calculation. Insurers also could easily confirm the accuracy of
the calculation.
Under these approaches, courts and juries similarly would not need
to grapple with the issue of whether the policyholder has proven what
“would have happened” to a “reasonable degree of certainty.”220
What would have happened is moot. The past becomes the proxy for
the future and it would be expressly stated in the policy.
These proposals also would eliminate the windfall gain or unfairly
low or non-existent claim payments that now occur when the

218. This proposal would not be appropriate, however, for new businesses or product lines that open
during the policy period or do not have a historical record of earnings and costs. In such circumstances,
an industry average for a comparable business or line of business for the prior three-year time period
should be used. Of course, the policyholder may have done better or worse than the industry average,
but using the industry average should eliminate the disputes about the state of the economy, industry
trends, and what the policyholder “would have done” in the hypothetical way in which such claims are
analyzed today.
219. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005).
220. See supra Part II.D.
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economic conditions post-catastrophe are considered for purposes of
calculating the loss.221 The policyholder would not get a windfall
benefit due to the increased demand for its product or services that is
created by the catastrophe in some circumstances or an unfairly low
or non-existent insurance payment when demand decreases in other
circumstances. Instead, the policyholder would receive its continuing
expenses and exactly what it had been earning before the catastrophe
occurred. Using a daily loss value or only historical financial
information would put the policyholder in the same position the
parties agreed at the time of underwriting that the policyholder most
likely would have been if the catastrophe had not occurred, which is
the very purpose of business interruption insurance.
Does the policyholder receive precisely what it would have
received had the catastrophe not occurred under this proposal? It is
impossible to know. One cannot predict the future with a high degree
of accuracy, which is why the “reasonable degree of certainty”
evidentiary standard is misplaced when attempting to value business
interruption insurance losses under the existing policy language.222
Nor can one create an accurate and complete picture of what a
hypothetical world would have looked like in the absence of a
catastrophe. The policyholder’s past, however, is known. Using the
policyholder’s past as a proxy for the policyholder’s future provides a
fair outcome for both the policyholder and the insurer in a situation
where one hundred percent accuracy is not possible.
Using a stated daily loss value or only the policyholder’s revenue
and cost data for the three-year time period immediately preceding
the loss when valuing the loss also should lead to consistent and
predictable outcomes. Although insurers may be required to pay
claims they might otherwise have chosen to litigate under the vague
valuation provisions currently used in their policies, the outcome of
disputes in which an insurer chooses to contest the payment of a
claim under these proposals should be fairly predictable because the
dispute would be decided under a bright line rule. Consequently,
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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insurers would be incentivized not to litigate claims they likely would
lose in order to avoid incurring wasteful litigation costs.
In addition to reducing the incentive to litigate, this predictability
in the outcome of disputes would be beneficial to insurers as well
because it would allow them to reserve for claims more accurately
and to establish with more certainty the amount of premiums needed
to cover claims and be profitable.223 Thus, this predictability also
should result in cost savings for insurers.
Using a stated daily loss value or only the policyholder’s historical
revenue and cost data when valuing business interruption losses also
should lead to a more cost-effective claims adjustment process. By
using a bright line formula, the parties should not need to retain
experts to engage in hypothetical debates regarding what would have
happened had the catastrophe not occurred. Nor should the parties
need to debate the impact the current state of the economy would
have on the policyholder’s hypothetical earnings and costs. Nor, in
most cases, should the courts and parties even need to conduct trials
regarding the amount of the loss. Further, to the extent the parties
cannot agree on the amount of the loss, the court in many instances
nonetheless should be able to resolve the dispute on a motion for
summary judgment because, assuming the facts are not in dispute,
resolution of the dispute would be a question of law. The judge
would only need to apply the daily loss value or the average
historical earnings and expenses to the number of days the
policyholder’s business was interrupted in order to determine the
amount of the covered loss.224 Thus, few trials should be needed, and,
223. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 802 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (“Insurance is a highly uncertain and risky endeavor, because it requires accurate predictions
about the occurrence and cost of future events. Insurers are able to define and limit the risks, and to set
premium levels commensurate with the risks, using complex and nuanced contracts (policies).”); Nancy
R. Page, Risky Business: Consumer Protection in the Insurance Industry, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287,
291 (1986) (“Predicting claims and pooling risks is the business of insurance. When accurate prediction
is no longer possible, some liability markets become theoretically too risky for insurance.”).
224. See, e.g., Private Bank & Trust Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 409 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir.
2005) (“We are presented with a question of insurance policy interpretation, which is a question of
law . . . .”); In re Frederick Petroleum Corp., 912 F.2d 850, 852 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that a question
of policy interpretation is a question of law); Farmers Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of Pocahontas,
129 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Ark. 2003) (“Whether the policy language is ambiguous is a question of law to be
resolved by the court.”); Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 29 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2010) (“This case
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in most cases, the parties should be able to resolve the claims without
even retaining experts or involving the courts.
2. Public Policy Considerations
Public policy also favors using a stated daily loss value or only the
historical earnings and costs of the policyholder when valuing
business interruption losses. As an initial matter, no obvious public
policy considerations favor the haphazard approach to valuing
business interruption losses that currently exist. Nor would the
typical theoretical concerns of insurers, such as adverse selection and
moral hazard, be implicated if a stated daily loss value or only
historical earnings and cost information were used.225
Adverse selection in the insurance context is “the disproportionate
tendency of those who are more likely to suffer losses to seek
insurance against those losses.”226 Insurers already face adverse
selection issues in the context of business interruption insurance
because businesses that are located in areas prone to floods,
hurricanes, or tornadoes naturally would be more incentivized to
purchase business interruption insurance.227 Changing the loss
valuation language, as proposed in this Article, however, should not
impact that problem positively or negatively.
Moral hazard is the tendency of a policyholder to take fewer
precautions when insured.228 Another commentator has defined the
presents a question of insurance policy interpretation, which is a question of law . . . .”).
225. Some critics of the concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard have argued that these alleged
threats are overblown and that the exclusions designed to address them are overly broad. See, e.g., Tom
Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 240 (1996); Peter Siegelman, Adverse
Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1234 (2004).
226. Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and the Tort
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82
(1993). See also MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 95 (8th
ed. 2005) (describing the difficulty underwriters have in determining the risk of insuring persons in poor
health); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 21–22
(8th ed. 1999) (noting how adverse selection accumulates bad risks, which disrupts underwriters’
predictions about future losses).
227. Abraham & Liebman, supra note 226, at 103; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 226, at 21–22.
228. Adam F. Scales, The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Century,” 94
VA. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2008) (reviewing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY:
INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008)) (“Moral hazard is the
tendency to take fewer precautions in the presence of insurance. Adverse selection is the tendency of
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concept of “moral hazard” as a situation where “[a]
person . . . deliberately causes a loss . . . [or] exaggerates the size of a
claim to defraud an insurer.”229
As a practical matter, there should be little concern by insurers that
policyholders would attempt to artificially increase their historical
earnings in anticipation of suffering losses due to events like
hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods. Indeed, doing so would lead to
higher premiums that the policyholders actually would hope they
never recouped because the last thing a policyholder running a
profitable business hopes for is that a hurricane, tornado, or flood
will hit it. Further, even if policyholders were inclined and able to
inflate the daily loss value, because policyholders do not create or
control catastrophic events such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods,
policyholders would not have the ability to cause the business
interruption losses that most commonly occur. Consequently, moral
hazard concerns would not be created by changing the loss valuation
language in accordance with this proposal.
Nonetheless, because daily loss values for business interruptions
are established at the time of underwriting, insurers would be free to
confirm or contest the accuracy of the cost and revenue numbers that
underlie those calculations before accepting a premium for the
policy.230 Moreover, because such numbers are annually updated
during the policy renewal process, there is little risk of the numbers
becoming outdated.231 Thus, any unlikely moral hazard concerns of
the insurer could and should be resolved before the policy is placed.
In addition, insurance fills the socially important and desirable role
of protecting the limited assets of individuals and business owners
against catastrophic losses by spreading and transferring the risk of
such losses to well-capitalized insurers.232 Indeed, insurance is
riskier people to gravitate towards unsuspecting insurance pools, eventually raising premium rates and
causing less risks people to exit. A great deal of insurer behavior is designed to combat, or at least
manage, these problems.”).
229. DORFMAN, supra note 226, at 480.
230. See supra note 216.
231. Id.
232. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1489, 1502 (2010).
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integral to people’s lives and the conduct of business in modern
industrial economies.233 Without insurance, people and businesses
simply cannot function in today’s world. For example, anyone who
wants to purchase a house using a bank to finance the mortgage is
required to have homeowners insurance in an amount adequate to
cover the mortgage.234 Anyone who wants to drive a car must have
auto insurance.235 Most states require businesses to have worker’s
compensation insurance.236
Similarly, if someone wants to live or do business in areas prone to
hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods, they need insurance to protect their
homes and businesses. Without it, they risk bankruptcy with each
passing storm. Further, if the business interruption insurance that is
actually purchased by a business owner does not cover the business’s
loss during a period of interruption, then the primary purpose of the
insurance has failed and the business owner and society in general
are in a worse position. Consequently, the adoption of either one of
these proposals would ensure that business interruption insurance
fulfills its important role in society.
The long-standing public policy of enforcing contracts also favors
the full payment of business interruption losses under insurance
policies.237 Indeed, as one court correctly noted, in the area of insurance
law, “[t]here is more than one public policy. One such policy is that an
insurance company which accepts a premium for covering all liability for
damages should honor its obligation.”238 Insurers draft the policies,
which are then sold on a take-it-or leave-it basis.239 As drafters of the
language contained in insurance policies, at a minimum, insurers should
state in the policies, in clear terms, the specific way that business
interruption losses will be valued. They have failed to do so and public
233. Id.at 1497.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1497–98.
236. Id. at 1498.
237. See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J.,
concurring) (noting that public policy favors the enforcement of contracts); Union Camp Corp. v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (“Exercise of the freedom of contract is not lightly to
be interfered with. It is only in clear cases that contracts will be held void as against public policy.”).
238. Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
239. See supra note 9.
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policy, as well as the rules of policy interpretation, dictates that insurers
should not be given the benefit of the doubt in such circumstances in their
quest to maximize their own profits.240
Consequently, in light of the fact that the purpose of business
interruption insurance is to protect the policyholder’s earnings in the event
business operations are interrupted,241 public policy favors interpreting or
using a loss calculation formula that ensures policyholders’ losses will be
paid in full in the event of catastrophes. To do otherwise creates the very
real possibility that policyholders could lose the reasonably expected
coverage they bought, which expectation is consistent with the purpose of
insurance generally and business interruption insurance specifically.
Basic principles of fairness also dictate this result. Insurers should
not be allowed to inconsistently apply the nebulous policy language
they themselves drafted in a coverage-minimizing or coveragedefeating manner depending upon whether the post-catastrophe
economic conditions favor the policyholder. Nor should
policyholders be required to prove the amount of their losses to a
reasonable degree of certainty when such calculations are based upon
a hypothetical world in which no interruption of the policyholder’s
business occurs. In short, public policy favors an interpretation or use
of a valuation provision that provides consistent, fair results. Using a
stated daily loss value or only the three prior years of the
policyholder’s revenue and cost data will provide consistent and fair
results.
Thus, insurers should redraft the valuation language in accordance
with either of the proposals discussed in this Article. If they fail to do
240. Sch. Dist. for City of Royal Oak v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Had the
company wished to exclude coverage for intentional religious discrimination in employment, it could
and should have said so.”); Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 568 (“Continental and other insurers which
have issued policies containing such clauses have not up to now conceived that they were violating
public policy by writing insurance policies insuring against losses resulting from discriminatory
employment practices.”); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (citing Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567–68); Univ. of Ill. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d
1338, 1350–51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[T]he insurer is an informed contracting party with no inferiority in
bargaining position and should not be allowed to escape from the contract it freely entered
into . . . . This court will not rewrite the . . . policy to create an exclusion.”); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697 v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“The carrier is, of course,
free to expressly provide an exclusion for such conduct in the future.”).
241. See supra note 6.
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so, then the courts should strictly construe the ambiguities in the
existing language against insurers. If neither insurers nor courts are
able to remedy the current problems, then legislatures need to enact
statutes that dictate how business interruption losses will be valued.
Indeed, history is replete with examples of legislatures acting to
reverse unsatisfactory decisions by courts242 or insurers’ refusals to
pay certain types of claims such as fire loss claims after the 1906
earthquake in San Francisco243 or to provide health insurance to
people who are sick.244 The valuation of business interruption losses
may be another area of insurance law in which legislatures need to
dictate the right solution if insurers and courts fail to do so. Of the
two proposals set forth in this Article, the author submits that the
easiest and fairest to apply would be to use a stated daily loss value
because it is a number that is agreed to by the parties at the time the
policy is purchased.
CONCLUSION
Business interruption losses can be enormous when a catastrophe
or disaster occurs. How such losses are valued for insurance purposes
can be the difference between a business surviving or failing. The
loss valuation language currently used in business interruption
policies provides almost no guidance regarding how such losses
should be valued.245 This vacuum has resulted in unnecessary
242. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.5 (West 2013) (statute provides that a life insurance policy is void “if
an impostor is substituted for a named insured in any part of the application process . . .” after the
Supreme Court of California, in Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 1264 (Cal.
1997), allowed a beneficiary to recover under a life insurance policy where the insured was HIV
positive but sent an imposter to do the medical exam required in order to procure the policy);
Christopher C. French, Construction Defects: Are They “Occurrences”?, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 27 n.91
(2011) (noting that several states have passed statutes which mandate that construction defects are
covered “occurrences” under commercial general liability policies in light of certain court decisions that
held construction defects are not occurrences).
243. French, supra note 142, at 217.
244. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010) (requiring, among other things, insurers to sell health insurance to people with preexisting health
conditions and disallowing insurers to cancel or refuse to renew policies of sick people).
245. See supra Part I.B.
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litigation, the inefficient resolution of claims, and conflicting court
decisions in which policyholders receive windfalls in some cases and
nothing in other cases under similar fact patterns and policy
language.246
Under the existing rules of policy interpretation, any ambiguities
in the policy language should be resolved in favor of the policyholder
when a claim is presented, and the reasonable expectations of the
policyholder should be fulfilled.247 Thus, because the existing loss
valuation policy language is ambiguous, one solution to the problem
of unfair loss valuations would be for courts to properly apply the
rules of policy interpretation to the existing policy language, which
should lead to inconsistent results that consistently favor the
policyholder.248
This Article, however, proposes better solutions. Instead of the ad
hoc approach that currently exists, a better approach would be to use
only the prior three years of the policyholder’s historical financial
revenue and cost data to value such losses. An even better approach,
however, would be to use the daily loss value that already is agreed
to by the policyholder and insurer annually during the policy renewal
underwriting process when the policy is purchased. Under either
approach, the payment of business interruption losses would be
consistent, fair, and predictable for both insurers and policyholders.
Further, under both approaches, litigation would be unnecessary for
most business interruption loss claims, which should be a welcome
result for everyone . . . except litigators and forensic accountants.

246. See supra Part II.
247. See supra Part III.
248. See supra Part IV.B.

